Halakhah sobre Êxodo 20:10

Avid sports fans often ask their Rabbanim if it is permitted to program devices before Shabbat that will record sporting events that are played on Shabbat. Shemot 20:10 seems to imply that Hashem requires us to ensure that only our animals, not our utensils, refrain from melachah on Shabbat. Thus, it would appear that Halachah permits us to record sports events on Shabbat, since we do not perform any labor on Shabbat, as only our utensils work.

"You shall not perform any labor" (Exodus 20:10): I [know] only that acts of labor and [their] derivatives are prohibited. Whence [do I know] to prohibit rabbinic forms of labor? The verse states "any labor." I would think that one is liable for a sin-offering for transgressing a rabbinic prohibition; [therefore] the verse states "labor"—there is liability [for a sin-offering] for designated labor but there is no liability [for transgression of] a rabbinic prohibition.

The Mishnayot (Shabbat 1:5-6) record a debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai regarding the scope of the prohibition of melachah on Shabbat. The Torah (Shemot 20:10) commands that our children, our slaves, and even our animals must rest on Shabbat. Beit Shamai argue that this prohibition extends even to one’s utensils. Thus, according to Beit Shamai, one cannot, for example, set a trap before Shabbat in order that an animal be caught on Shabbat, as this constitutes his utensil performing melachah on Shabbat.

Here are honest witnesses that the day begins with dusk. Similarly for all the holidays and the Sabbath, for all are “appointed seasons of God, holy gatherings” (ibid. 23:4). Only the Sabbath is called “a Sabbath for God” (Exodus 20:10, Deuteronomy 5:14), for God rested during Creation. Since both the year and the day are dependent on the sun, for both motions are similar one to another, therefore the seventh year is comparable to the Sabbath day. Hence it is also written with regard to the seventh year “a Sabbath for God” (Leviticus 25:2). Therefore, just as the Sabbatical year begins with the autumn season, so the beginning of the Sabbath day is in that period of the day corresponding to autumn, which begins with dusk.

Rav Dov Brisman (a prominent Rav and Dayan in Philadelphia) presents quite a compelling defense of this practice in Teshuvot Shalmei Chovah (Y.D. 63). Rav Brisman notes other areas in which we seem not to treat pesukim as Chazal would prefer. The issue he focuses on is the common practice to recite fragments of pesukim, such as “Vayehi erev vayehi voker yom hashishi” (Bereishit 1:31) at the start of Friday night kiddush and “Al kein beirach Hashem et yom hashabbat vayekashsheihu” (Shemot 20:10) at the start of Shabbat morning kiddush, despite the Gemara's apparent injunction against splitting a pasuk which Moshe Rabbeinu did not split in the Torah (Taanit 27b). While many, such as Mishnah Berurah (289:2) and Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (Nefesh HaRav p.159), adopt a strict practice not to recite fragments of pesukim, common practice is to be lenient, as noted by the Mishnah Berurah.

And I am surprised at a man who counted all of those that are liable for the death penalties of the court - every single one, those liable for excision and those liable for death - among the negative commandments, when he also counted among the the negative commandments, the things from which they were prohibited for which one is liable for death. As the author of the Halakhot Gedolot (Behag) counted one who desecrates the Shabbat among those that are liable for stoning, and then [also] counted, "you shall not do any work" (Exodus 20:10). There is no other option but that they without a doubt first thought that the punishments were [individual] negative commandments. But how could one count both the punishment and the matter about which one is liable for that punishment among them? And more difficult than this is that he counted those that are liable for excision and death at the hands of the Heavens as negative commandments; and that they thought that the liability for excision is the counted commandment. So much so that the author of the Sefer HaMitzvot (of Rav Chafetz Gaon) revealed his opinion about this and said this thing in the first chapter - while explaining what is included in that chapter. These are his words: "And among them are thirty-two matters that He told us that He, may He be blessed, is designated for its doing and not us; and all of them are guaranteed." Indeed, by saying, "among them," he is saying that they are from the things he is including in that chapter. And the content of the thirty-two are the twenty-three sins for which one is liable for excision and the nine for which one is liable for death at the hands of the Heavens, as he counted. And the content of his saying, "guaranteed," is that He, may He be blessed, guarantees that he will excise or kill him. If so, there is no doubt that he did not retain with him that he is to believe that all of the 613 commandments are obligations upon us; but rather [thought] that there are are some of them that we are obligated, and some of them that He, may He be blessed, is obligated - as I will explain. And he said that He is designated for their doing, not us! Upon my life, this is a great confusion to me! It is inappropriate to [even] speak about this in any way, as they are clearly empty words. However they all made this mistake by counting the punishments as commandments and became confused by them. Sometimes they would count them by themselves and sometimes they would count [both] the punishments and the thing for which one is punished, and they made them all negative commandments - without reflection. But the true way of counting is that which I have mentioned - that each type of punishment be a positive commandment, such that the law of the payment of a thief be a positive commandment; for we were commanded to punish him with his money according to this measure. And likewise is the addition of a fifth a positive commandment; and the law of the obligation of a fixed sin-offering is a commandment; and the law of the obligation of a definite guilt-offering is a commandment; and the law of an uncertain guilt-offering is a commandment; and the variable sacrifice is a commandment. And each one of these punishments - burning, stoning, killing, strangling and hanging - is its own positive commandment. This is regardless of the [class] of people that are liable for it; just as lashes are one commandment regardless of who is liable. And this is what we wanted to preface about this principle. And with it are all the principles completed, the prefacing of which will assist you in that which we are involved.

It is also appropriate for us to attach this preface: And that is that anything for which one is liable a death penalty of the court or excision is perforce a negative commandment - except for the Passover (sacrifice) and circumcision. For they involve excision, even though they are positive commandments - as they said at the beginning of Tractate Keritot (Keritot 2a). But besides them, there are absolutely no positive commandments for which one who transgresses them would be liable for excision; all the more so a death penalty of the court. And anything about which it appears in the Torah, that if one does a certain action, he is to be killed or become liable for excision - it is certainly known that this act is prohibited and that it is a negative commandment. But behold sometimes Scripture explains the punishment alongside the prohibition, such that it explains the punishment and the prohibition. For example, the desecration of Shabbat and idolatry - about which it states, "you shall not do any work" (Exodus 20:10), and "you shall not worship them" (Exodus 20:5); and afterwards renders the one who does work [on Shabbat] or who worships idolatry liable for stoning. And sometimes the prohibition is not made clear as a definite negative commandment in Scripture; but He rather mentions the punishment and omits the prohibition. But the principle amongst us is that Scripture does not punish [for something] unless it prohibited [it], and that it is impossible not to have a prohibition for anyone who is liable a punishment. And hence, it is said in every place, "We have heard the punishment; from where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, such and such." And when the prohibition is not in Scripture, it is learned out by one of the Talmudic methods - like that which they mentioned about the prohibition of cursing one's father and mother and of striking one's father and mother, which is not explicit in Scripture at all. As it did not say, "You shall not strike your father." Yet it made one who strikes or curses liable for a death penalty. Hence we know that they are negative commandments; and we derived the prohibition for them - and those like them - from other places, by way of analogy. And this does not contradict their saying, "We do not derive a prohibition from an inference," nor their always saying, "And can we derive a prohibition from a derivation?" For we only say, "We do not derive a prohibition from an inference," regarding the derivation from an analogy of a prohibition that is not understood at all. However when we find the punishment for one who does this action explicit in the Torah, we perforce know that it is a forbidden action from which we are prohibited. Yet we regardless derive it from an analogy, so that the principle of their saying, "Scripture did not punish [for something] unless it prohibited [it]," be reinforced. But once the prohibition has come to us - not to do that thing - the one who transgressed and did [it] will become liable for excision or death. And know this principle and guard it together with the previous ones, to remember it in all that is coming up.

To not do work on Shabbat: To not do work on the day of Shabbat ourselves; and not allow our children, slaves and animals to do so, as it is stated (Exodus 20:10), "you shall not do work, etc." There is no doubt that even though the verse issues a [single blanket] prohibition on us, our children, servants, and animals, they are not all equal; as we see that one who volitionaly does work with his own body will be liable for the death penalty in a court. But with the work of others - even though he is warned about them with a negative commandment - he is not liable for them; [not] even with lashes, as lashes are never for the act of others. And from the language of Rambam, may his memory be blessed, (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Sabbath 20:1) it is implied that he holds that this prohibition of " you shall not do work, you [...] and your animal," comes upon letting an animal work (mechamer) while being behind it - for example, that he is using it to plow. As, according to his opinion, letting an animal work by itself is only a prohibition [embedded] in a positive commandment. And hence, according to his opinion, they said in the Gemara (Shabbat 154a) that this negative commandment of letting your animals do work is a negative commandment that is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court - meaning to say, that a man is killed for it, and [so] there are no lashes for it. But Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (on Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Shorashim 14) wrangles with him greatly on this explanation, and says that this negative commandment of letting your animals do work is only about walking behind his animal laden with his load, while the man does not do any act with his hands. And therefore neither lashes nor the death penalty would ever come to him; and it is as that which has been established for us, we do not administer lashes for any negative commandment that does not have an act. [And it is] like they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Shabbat 154b), "'You [...] and your animal' - let it write, you shall not do work and your animal'; why do I need 'you?' [To tell you] that when he does work, he is liable; but for the work of his animal he is not lia work ble." Rather, he is [just] warned about it with a negative commandment, like with the work of his young child and his Canaanite slave. But for his own actual work - for that there was no reason to say that he is liable, as behold, his punishment is explicit (Exodus 34:2), "any one who does work on it shall die." And according to the opinion of Ramban, may his memory be blessed, the explanation of that which they said in the Gemara about the negative commandment of letting your animal do work, that it is a negative commandment that is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court, is that since it also includes the other [types of] work which [come] with a warning of a death penalty from the court - even though with letting your animal work there is certainly only a negative commandment, as there is also not [even] lashes with it - nonetheless, this negative commandment is [called] a negative commandment that is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court because of those things that it includes that have death penalties of the court. And similar to this did they, may their memory be blessed, say in the first chapter of Eruvin 17b about the negative commandment of "let no man leave his place": Since it also includes carrying out from one domain to another - like the teaching that they expounded, [read, do not go out (yetseh), as] do not carry out (yotsee) - that it is from now a negative commandment that is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court in some of its matters. And since it is so, we can say that we do not administer lashes for it, in all of its matters. And in exactly the same way, we can explain the negative commandment of not letting your animal do work here.

R. Jacob Chai Zerichan develops a novel thesis on the basis of which he dismisses the solution offered by Hatam Sofer. Of the thirty-nine forbidden categories of "labor" on Shabbat, thirty-eight are derived from the verse "you shall do no work" (Exodus 20:10). The thirty-ninth, transfer of an object from a private domain to a public thoroughfare or transport of an object over a distance of four cubits in a public thoroughfare, is not derived from that verse but is the subject of a tradition received by Moses at Sinai (halakhah le-Mosheh mi-Sinai). Based upon Rambam's ruling, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:10, it has become a well-established principle that such traditions are directed solely to Jews, but are inapplicable and of no effect insofar as Noahides are concerned.²⁶Cf., however, infra, note 29 and accompanying text. Accordingly, argues Rabbi Zerichan, since "labor" is only that which is defined as such by Scripture, carrying a "burden" in a prohibited area does not constitute a form of "labor" insofar as non-Jews are concerned. Hence performing an act of this nature would not negate the "rest" which is forbidden to non-Jews over a twenty-four hour period.²⁷See also Pirḥei Nisan included by R. Yitzchak Reitbard in his Kehillat Yiẓḥak al ha-Torah (Vilna, 5660), Parashat Toldot. Pirḥei Nisan, discussing the problem of Sabbath observance by the Patriarchs, advances a somewhat modified form of this solution. He assumes that the status of the Patriarchs was “doubtful,” i.e., that it was not clear whether their status was that of Jews or that of Noahides. Accordingly, he indicates that they had the option of wearing a garment with ẓiẓit and making the express stipulation that if their status be that of Jews they don the garment with the intention of fulfilling the commandment, but that if their status be that of Noahides they have no intention to fulfill the commandment.
That discussion suggests an expedient that may readily be utilized by a prospective convert who is discomfited by the prospect of overt violation of Sabbath restrictions. Clearly, when the ẓiẓit are not worn for the purpose of fulfilling a miẓvah they constitute a “burden.” Accordingly, a non-Jew who desires to observe Shabbat might avail himself of the expedient of stipulating categorically that he dons the garment with ẓiẓit with the express intention of not fulfilling the miẓvah. Thus, for him, the ẓiẓit would constitute a burden.

That the court not administer a death sentence on the Shabbat: That the judges not administer sentences on Shabbat, meaning to say that they not kill on the Shabbat one who has been made liable for the death penalty by the court, as it is stated (Exodus 35:3), "You shall not kindle fire throughout your settlements on the Shabbat day." And the explanation comes about this (Yevamot 6b) that the court should not burn someone who has become liable for burning. And the same is true for the other death penalties. And it is [correct] for us to expound this thing from [this verse]; as behold, it is not necessary for itself, as behold, it is already written in another place, "you shall not do work" (Exodus 20:10) - and kindling is for the sake of work. Rather, it is written to teach [another] matter. And they explained about it that it came to teach us this [matter] that we said. And this is the language of Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 35:3:2 (at the beginning of Parshat Vayakhel): "'You shall not kindle fire' - burning was in the general category [of forbidden work], yet it was [specified, in order] to teach that just like burning is particular in that it is one of the death penalties of the court and [we see here] that it does not push off the Shabbat, so too all of the other death penalties do not push off the Shabbat." And even with all that we have learned in this verse, it should also be expounded [for] that which they also expounded on it (Yevamot 6b), "Kindling was [specified] to separate" - meaning to say that one who does many principle categories of work at one time in one forgetful spell would be liable a sin-offering for each and every [type of] work by itself. And in the Gemara of the Westerners they said (Talmud Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:6), "'In all of your settlements' - Rabbi Ila said in the name of Rabbi Yannai, 'From here [we learn] about courts, that they should not judge on Shabbat.'"