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וכי ימכר איש את בתו לאמה AND IF A MAN SELL HIS DAUGHTER TO BE A MAIDSERVANT — The text speaks of a minor daughter (under 12 years of age). You might think that he may sell her also although she may have shown signs of incipient puberty and is no longer a minor! You must admit, however, that the à fortiori argument applies: How is it in the case of a woman who was sold at an earlier age (as a minor)? She goes free on showing signs of incipient puberty, as it is said, (v. 11) “then shall she go out free without money”, which law we explain to refer to a woman who has showed such signs during the period of slavery! Is it not the conclusion that she who is of such an age and has not yet been sold shall not be sold at all?! (Arakhin 29b, cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:7:1).

SHE SHALL NOT GO OUT AS THE MENSERVANTS DO. This means that the Hebrew maidservant does not go out free “in consequence of the loss of a tooth or an eye, as Canaanite slaves do.”⁶⁶See further, Verses 26-27. Thus is Rashi’s language, and our Rabbis interpreted it likewise.⁶⁰Mechilta here on the Verse. Indeed it is so, for a Hebrew servant is not called eved⁶⁷The Hebrew servant may be called eved ivri [as in Verse 2 here: if thou buy an ‘eved ivri’ — a Hebrew servant] but never just eved, which term by itself signifies a Canaanite bondman. Here in Verse 7 where it just says ha’avadim (menservants) it must therefore refer to the Canaanite bondmen. For a similar statement of Ramban see also further Verse 20. without any further qualification.
But I wonder: why does Scripture find it necessary altogether to tell us this [that a Hebrew maidservant does not go out free because of the loss of a tooth or eye, as Canaanite bondmen do]?⁶⁸For what reason might I have thought that she does go out free, so that Scripture should find it necessary to tell us that such is not the case? Perhaps it is to tell us that we should not argue by applying the method of kal vachomer⁶⁹See in Seder Bo Note 208. — The kal vachomer in this case would be as follows: A Canaanite bondwoman who does not go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee year, does go out free because of the loss of any of the chief external organs. It is therefore only logical that a Hebrew maidservant, who does go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee, should surely go out free because of the loss of any chief external organs. from a Canaanite women, that a Hebrew maidservant goes out free because of the loss of a tooth or eye. This law is stated expressly in the case of a Hebrew woman, but such is also the law for a Hebrew man, who has been compared to her [thus he too does not go out free because of the loss of any of the chief external organs]. The author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth,’⁷⁰Rabbi Shimon Kairo, who flourished in the second half of the eighth century — when the Gaonic period was at its height. Considered a most authoritative work on Rabbinic law, the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’ was a pioneer in the field of Taryag (613) Commandments, for in a preface to this work the author was the first scholar who attempted to define each separate commandment (see my foreword to “The Commandments,” Vol. I pp. viii — ix). wrote, however, that [the verse is not needed to exclude this kal vachomer,⁶⁹See in Seder Bo Note 208. — The kal vachomer in this case would be as follows: A Canaanite bondwoman who does not go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee year, does go out free because of the loss of any of the chief external organs. It is therefore only logical that a Hebrew maidservant, who does go out free at the end of six years or in the jubilee, should surely go out free because of the loss of any chief external organs. for even if Scripture had not excluded it, we could not have argued that a Hebrew woman should go out free in consequence of the loss of a tooth or eye], because the going forth to freedom by slaves on account of the loss of a tooth or eye is a penalty [to the master], and you cannot derive a law by logical argument from penalties. The author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’ thus considered this verse a negative commandment⁷¹As opposed to a mere “negation,” where the verse just negates a certain law from being applicable, without constituting a prohibition. In his Book of the Commandments, Maimonides dedicated the eighth principle to the clarification of this distinction between a negation and a prohibition, and without mentioning the name of the author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth,’ differs with him on the interpretation of this verse, which in his opinion merely states that there is no obligation on the part of the master to let her go free where he causes her the loss of one of her organs. [See in my translation, “The Commandments,” Vol. II pp. 390-393.] In his notes to Maimonides’ Book of Commandments, Ramban came to the defense of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth.’ wherein G-d warns the master that if he wants to send her out free because of the loss of a tooth or eye, that he transgresses a prohibition; but instead he is to pay her monetary compensation for the tooth or eye, and she shall stay with him up to the time [of six years, or before if she produces signs of puberty], to be designated as the master’s wife [or his son’s]. For it would be a great injustice if, after causing her the loss of a tooth in his anger and blemishing her thereby, he would then send her out of his house, when she had hoped to become his wife. Moreover, many times the monetary compensation for the damage done to the chief external organs, is more than the earnings for her labor if her days as a handmaid have nearly terminated. Therefore Scripture was strict upon the master and made a clear prohibition, so that he should not rob her of the monetary compensation due to her for the loss of any of her chief organs, even if he should want to let her go free on account of them. It may be that sending her to freedom is itself forbidden before the fixed time, for Scripture has obliged the master to support her and that she stay with him, in case she finds favor in his eyes and becomes his wife; just as He warned him with a prohibition that [after he marries her and takes another wife] her food, her raiment, and her conjugal rights shall he not diminish.⁷²Verse 10. In accordance with this opinion [the author of the ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’] counted the verse, She shall not go out as the menservants do among the three hundred and sixty-five negative commandments.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים. It is not appropriate for an upstanding member of society to buy a Jewish girl as a servant against her will. Such a “sale” is acceptable only if the girl in question will become the wife of the buyer or his son when reaching puberty. The purchase price will be given to her father as our sages have stipulated in Ketuvot 46.

וכי ימכר איש את בתה, When a man sells his daughter, etc. In this instance as opposed to verse 2, the Torah emphasises the seller instead of the buyer. The reason is that one does not purchase a Jewish maidservant from anyone other than her father. The girl does not sell herself, as does an impoverished male. The law of selling a thief in payment of what he has stolen from his victim also does not apply to female thieves (compare Mechilta). The additional letter ו in the word וכי, means that the father of the girl does not only have the right to marry her off, but also to sell her as a maidservant.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, after the expiry of six years. Her employer is supposed to marry her, as will be explained later.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “she will not be free in the manner male servants are freed.” Loss by the servant of an eye or a tooth, through violent action by the master, leads to the servant’s immediate freedom. The same rule applies to the male Jewish servant. We need a special verse for this lack of symmetry governing treatment of gentile slaves when abused, and that of Jewish servants similarly abused, as without it we would have deduced from an a fortiori, that if a gentile slave is freed immediately due to his master having rendered a tooth or an eye useless, a Jewish servant would be entitled to at least the same privilege. If this logic were to be applied, the Jewish servant would forfeit his entitlement to compensatory damages, something he does not in fact forfeit. The basic difference in the legislation is that in the case of the gentile slave the freeing of the slave (whose body was owned by his master) is in the nature of a penalty to his master for having abused him. Whenever the Torah legislates a penal measure it cannot serve as a model for other situations. Our verse must be understood as a negative commandment not to release a female or male Jewish servant for loss of eye or tooth, and that doing so, far from being a charitable act, is in fact the violation of a negative commandment. The Torah is stringent with the master, closing a loophole that would have enabled him to escape his financial obligations to the victim of his cruelty or carelessness. The Hebrew servant or female servant is compensated according to the rules prevailing for any other Jewish male or female, and in the event that the compensation exceeds the value of the servant’s labour still to be rendered under his contract, the master (employer) does not have the option of freeing such a servant forthwith. Such a temptation for the master is especially likely when the incident occurred near the end of the forced employment term of said servant. Alternatively, the plain meaning of the phrase is that maidservants, unlike men servants, are not supposed to be sent outside, into the fields, for instance, to perform their labours, but are to do this in the house of the master or in his yard.

וכי ימכור איש את בתו לאמה, “when a man sells his daughter as a maid-servant, etc.” This verse is the father’s authority to “sell” his daughter for her own benefit as long as she is less than 12 years old (Mechilta Nezikin section 3).
לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “the terms of her release will not parallel the conditions of freedom for her male counterpart.” She will not leave the service of her master like a Gentile male slave, i.e. through loss of an organ such as an eye, a tooth, etc. (ibid). Whenever the word עבד or אמה is found in the Torah without additional data such as “Jewish” or ”Egyptian,” Canaanite slaves are meant. When the Torah speaks of a Hebrew servant the fact that he is Jewish is spelled out (compare 21,2). The warning in our verse is addressed to the employer of such a Jewish maidservant that if he would release (kick out) his maidservant due to loss of, say an eye, he would be guilty of violating this negative commandment. Instead of releasing her from his service he has to compensate her for the loss including pain, embarrassment, etc., (based on the author of Halachot Gedolot). She continues in her position for the agreed upon period.

Comparing the Hebrew woman to the Hebrew man. . . attaining their freedom. This teaches that she goes out even at the yovel, because going out after six years is written expressly in the verse of “If there should be sold to you your Hebrew brother or your Hebrew sister. . .”

V. 7. Aus V. 8 wissen wir, dass mit diesem Verkauf ייעוד, d. h. die Bedingung verbunden sein musste, das Mädchen eventuell zu heiraten, in welchem Falle das dem Vater gegebene Geld den Charakter der Traugabe erhielt מעות ראשנות לקידושין נתנו (siehe Kiduschin 18 b). Beide eventuelle Wirkungen dieses Verkaufs lassen schon schließen, dass er nur in einem Alter geschehen konnte, in welchem sowohl die Arbeitskräfte des Kindes juridisch Eigentum des Vaters sind, und ebenso juridisch dem Vater die Befugnis zusteht, über die Hand seines Kindes zu disponieren, d. h. eine Ehe für dasselbe einzugehen und an seiner Statt die Traugabe zu empfangen; also nur in dem Alter unmündiger Minderjährigkeit. Für beide Beziehungen reicht dieselbe sonst bis zur vollendeten Pubertätsreife, d. h. bis zu sechs Monaten nach eingetretener Pubertät, in der Regel bis zu zwölfundeinhalb Jahr, wo dann das Mädchen בכר ,בקר ,פקר ,בגר) בוגרת) "selbständig" heißt (Ketubot 46 b). Die Ermächtigung zu diesem Verkauf dauert jedoch nur während der Zeit völliger Unmündigkeit קטנות bis zum Eintritt der Pubertät, mit welcher das Mädchen נערה wird, in der Regel bis zum zurückgelegten zwölften Jahre. Diese Beschränkung dürfte schon darauf hinweisen, dass bei diesem ganzen Verhältnis die beabsichtigte Eventualität der Heirat in dem Vordergrunde steht. Das Mädchen bleibt nur so lange Magd, als es noch nicht heiratsfähig ist. Mit Eintritt der Heiratsfähigkeit muss der Herr sie entweder heiraten oder unentgeltlich frei lassen (siehe V. 11).

וכי ימכור איש, “If someone “sells” his daughter, etc.;” according to Rashi, he can only do so while she is less than 12 years of age. If someone were to claim that the father can still do so when that daughter has demonstrated signs of puberty, and that person would argue that the work performed by a daughter belongs to her father even while she is between 12 years and 12 and a half years old, the Torah has added the word לאמה, “to become a maid-servant.” She cannot be “sold” as such when older than 12 years and a day.Some scholars are of the opinion that when a minor male had been “sold” by his father, that minor would be free to leave the employment of his masters when he displayed signs of puberty. This is totally erroneous, as nowhere did we read that a father may “sell” a son, and to draw a comparison from the text in Deuteronomy 15,12, where a male Israelite is described as “selling” himself is quite absurd. If that verse would speak about a minor boy, say an orphan, selling himself. This would be legally completely invalid as minors cannot do such a thing in Jewish law. The reason is that a Jewish court has no authority to penalise a minor. (Compare the addition to Rashi’s commentary on that verse)

וכי ימכור איש את בתו, “in the event that a father ‘sells’ his daughter, etc.;” the reason why the father here has been described as איש, “a man,” is to make clear that a mother is not allowed to “sell” her daughter.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים SHE SHALL NOT GO OUT AS THE MENSERVANTS DO — i. e. not under the circumstances that the Canaanitish menservants’ departure takes place, for these go free in consequence of the loss of their tooth or eye inflicted by their master; this woman, however, shall not go free because of such loss of her tooth or eye, but shall serve either six years or until the Jubilee, or until she shows signs of incipient puberty. Whichsoever of these periods comes first brings her freedom first. — He (the master), however, has to pay her the value of her eye or the value of her tooth. — Or perhaps this is not so, but, “she shall not go out as the men-servants do,” means she shall not go free as the Hebrew menservants do, viz., at the end of six years or at the Jubilee? Scripture, however, states, (Deuteronomy 15:12) And if thy brother, an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman be sold unto thee”, comparing the Hebrew woman with the Hebrew man in regard to all reasons for departure (i. e. also with regard to her going free in the Jubilee, for that she goes free in the seventh year is stated in the text just quoted). How is it in the case of a Hebrew man? He goes free at the end of six years and at the Jubilee! So, too, does the Hebrew woman go free at the end of six years and at the Jubilee. What then do these words mean: “she shall not go out as the menservants do”? They mean: she shall not go free in consequence of the loss of one of “the tips of her limbs” (i. e. the ends of limbs that project from the body) (cf. Mishnah Negaim 6:7) inflicted by the master, as the Canaanitish servants do when they that lose “the tips of their limbs” (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:1; Kiddushin 20a). Incidentally I may add that you might think that the Hebrew manservant shall go free in consequence of loss of one of the tips of his limbs and that only the Hebrew maidservant differs in this respect from the Canaanitish servant, since Scripture expressly specified her in the words: she shall not go out free etc. Scripture, however, states “an Hebrew man or an Hebrew woman” thereby comparing the Hebrew man with the Hebrew woman. What is the case with the Hebrew woman? She does not go free in consequence of loss of one of “the tips of her limbs”! So, too, the Hebrew man does not go free as compensation for the injury inflicted on one of “the tips of his limbs” (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:3:1).

Thereby comparing the Hebrew man to the Hebrew woman: You might ask: Since the Hebrew man is compared to the Hebrew woman, should he not too, go free upon showing signs of puberty? The answer is: There is no case of a male Hebrew slave showing signs of puberty, [since he is always an adult before he is sold]. For a minor cannot sell himself, as a minor’s transactions have no validity. And the court cannot sell a minor for his theft, since a minor is not subject to punishment. And a father cannot sell his son, because it is written in our verse, “If a man sells his daughter to be a maidservant,” thus excluding the sale of his son. All this is explained by the Re’m.

איש את בתו, a man his daughter, etc. We learned in Sotah 23 that the word איש, is used to exclude the right of a woman to sell her daughter. The word את is to tell us that whereas a man may sell himself, a woman may not (Mechilta). You have to read the verse thusly: "And a man may sell his daughter." If the Torah had not commenced the verse with the conjunctive letter ו, but had merely written: "A man may sell his daughter," I would have known only that he may sell his daughter but not that she could not sell herself.

Alles ferner, was wir aus unserm nationalen Schrifttum über die hohe Stellung des jüdischen Weibes (siehe Jeschurun, Jahrgang X und Xl), über das Verhältnis der Eltern zu ihren Kindern, sowie über die von Eltern bei Verheiratung ihrer Kinder zu beachtenden Rücksichten wissen, lässt uns ohne weiteres voraussetzen, dass: "כי ימכור איש את בתו לאמה" "wenn auf diese Weise ein jüdischer Mann sein kleines unmündiges Kind zur Magd, eventuell zur Ehegattin verkauft" ihn nur die äußerste, bitterste Not dazu gebracht haben kann. Er muss erst Haus und Hof und sein letztes Hemd verkauft haben, bevor er sich zu diesem Schritt entschließen darf (Kiduschin 20 a, Ramb. Hilch. Abadim IV 2).

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, the terms under which she leaves the employ of her “master” are not the same as apply to male “servants.” Ibn Ezra explains specifically that his master cannot force such a servant to perform labour outside the master’s home. [not found in the Ibn Ezra editions of Mossad harav Kook. Ed.]

את בתו, “his daughter,” but not his son.

לאמה, as a maidservant, etc. We have to interpret this expression by following the Talmud in Kidushin 4 that even if the daughter has displayed the marks of barrenness the father may still sell her. The emphasis of the Torah on לאמה, [something that is self-evident, for as what else would the father sell her? Ed.] teaches that although this girl is not marriage-material this does not diminish the father's right to sell her into service. We could also approach this expression from the point of view expressed in the Tossephta Bikkurim chapter 4, according to which the word is needed to exclude the father's right to sell her if there are doubts about her sex. If there are indications that she is a hermaphrodite or a Tumtum (having hidden genitals preventing determination of what sex she is), the father or the court could not exercise the right to sell her/him into service. The word לאמה is not superfluous then.

Soll doch auch sonst der Vater nicht einmal von der einen Befugnis, seine minderjährige Tochter zu verheiraten, Gebrauch machen. Geradezu אסור heißt es: אסור לאדם שיקדש את בתו כשהיא קטנה עד שתגדל ותאמר בפלוני אני רוצה "Verboten ist es, seine Tochter als Kind zu verheiraten bis sie großjährig geworden und sage: Den möchte ich gerne zum Manne!" und ist damit nicht nur jeder Zwang, sondern selbst das gar nicht seltene Überreden einer Tochter zu einer Heirat als sündhaft erklärt (Kiduschin 41 a). Ein Bündnis, das die innigste Vereinigung bedingt, kann nur aus völligster Freiwilligkeit wahrhaft gedeihen. Die juridische Befugnis erteilt das Gesetz dem Vater, es weiß, ein jüdischer Vater wird nur in dringenden Lagen davon Gebrauch machen, in denen eine solche Disposition über die Zukunft des Kindes dessen Rettung und Wohlfahrt begründet. Für solche Fälle ist das Vorhandensein der gesetzlichen Zulässigkeit solcher und ähnlicher Verfahrungsweisen kein geringes Glück, und haben sie sich in dem wechselvollen Geschick des jüdischen Volkes als solche erwiesen (siehe daselbst הוספו׳). Kühn durfte das Gesetz in Statuierung solcher Bestimmungen dem abstrakten Rechtsbegriffe die praktische Folge einräumen. Es wusste sich durch alle seine übrigen Institutionen solche Gemüter zu schaffen und zu pflegen, denen man ruhig solche Möglichkeiten in Händen geben konnte, ohne Missbrauch befürchten zu müssen. Nennt doch das Gesetz selbst, V. 8, das Verfahren des Vaters vom Standpunkte des Kindes aus: בגידה, einen Treubruch, einen Gegensatz zu dem, was sonst ein Kind von seinem Vater zu erwarten hat, und zeigt damit deutlich genug, dass es den Fall nur als Ausnahme betrachtet wissen will.

לא תצא כצאת בעבדים, “she will not leave her “master’s” employ according to the same rules as does a male “slave.” Rashi explains the word עבדים in this verse as referring to Canaanite slaves. If someone had thought that it referred to Jewish slaves, consider the fact that the Torah had separately legislated what the terms are when Jewish slave leaves his “master” in Deuteronomy 15,12. The conditions for releasing Jewish “slaves” had stipulated there that no difference is made between males and females. If you were to ask why the same rule does not apply regarding releasing a Jewish boy “servant” when he displays signs of puberty, seeing that we have a principle that the exegetical tool known as heckesh, a comparison spelled out in the Torah, must not be applied in an arbitrary manner, the reason is that there cannot be a situation in which such a comparison could be legally valid, as there is no situation when the Torah provides for a male’s puberty resulting in such a change of his status. If he had sold himself as a minor, the sale would not have been recognised as legally valid. We have already learned that his father was also not legally empowered to sell him. Rashi explains further that the comparison that the Torah made between a female Jewish “slave” and a male one, applies to the fact that neither of them obtain their release by having lost one or more of their organs, including even the loss of a tooth. This law applies only to gentile slaves. If you were to argue that we did not need to have this spelled out for us as we could have arrived at this conclusion by using simple logic, i.e. if a female Jewish ”slave,” who is released after displaying signs of puberty, is not released when losing an organ, it is clear that a male Jewish slave who is not released from service when displaying signs of puberty, is most certainly not released either when he loses an organ. We must therefore conclude that this socalled logic is faulty, as an opposite conclusion could be arrived at by using the “same” logic in reverse. What is the disadvantage a female Jewish “slave” labours under? She does not get her release as a result of losing an organ. Seeing that she had not been sold as a result of having committed theft, her male counterpart would certainly not be released under similar circumstances as he had been sold as a penalty for having committed theft. In order not to arrive at the wrong conclusion by using “our” logic, the Torah therefore wrote: “the male Jew or the female Jew” in Deuteronomy 15,12. לא תצא כצאת העבדים, “the rules for her release are not the same as that for her male counterparts.” According to the plain meaning of this verse the Torah here is inserting a rule of civilised behaviour, derech eretz. Men are sent on errands all over the earth, by day and night, and encounter all kinds of temptation while doing so. If women had to doo this, this would be considered a great disgrace for them. The Torah therefore states that female Jewish servants are to be used by their masters only for tasks that do not require tem to leave their immediate environment, the master’s home. In Psalms 45,14 this is summed up under the heading of: כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה, “the entire glory of the King’s daughter is within her,” (not on public display) Furthermore, the female Jewish “slaves” under discussion here are all minors. An alternate approach: Whereas the male “slaves” leave the master’s employ unaccompanied by children they had sired while in his employ, (as discussed earlier) the female Jewish “slave,” if her master wants to have children by her, must first marry her, in which case she ceases to be a “slave” anyways. If the marriage does not work out, she will be divorced and take her children with her, like any normal woman who is divorced from her husband and gets a financial settlement.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים, she will not leave the service according to the conditions applying to male slaves. Our sages in Kidushin 16 understand this as a comparison with a Gentile slave who obtains his freedom if the master (or his agent) caused any of 24 specified injuries. The justification for this interpretation is the Torah's use of the word עבדים without specifying the addition עבריים, "Jewish ones." When the Torah applies the term עבד to a Jew it is always accompanied by the adjective עברי. A Jew is not just a "slave." I believe that the plain meaning of the verse is that whereas male Jewish slaves do not leave the employ of the master before their six years of service have expired, even if the master to whom they have been sold has died before the completion of the six years, this rule does not apply to a female Jewish maidservant. As soon as her master dies she is free to leave.

לא תצא כצאת העבדים: abgesehen davon, daß עבדים עברים nicht wohl unter העבדים ohne nähere Beifügung verstanden werden, kann schon darum hier nur an עבדים כנעניים gedacht werden, weil durch כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה וגו׳ ואף לאמתך תעשה כן (Dewarim 15, 12, 17) dem ibrischen Knecht die ibrische Magd in allen freimachenden Momenten, dem siebten Dienstjahre, dem Jobel und dem Tode des Herrn (— sie ist darin dem נרצע gleich und hat nicht einmal dem Sohne zu dienen —) gleich gestellt ist. Es kann daher hier, wie auch die Halacha lehrt, nur an עבדים כנעניים gedacht sein, die nach V. 20 ihre Freiheit durch Körperverletzung erhalten, יוצאים בראשי איברים. Das ibrische Mädchen, und so auch, durch die vorhin zitierte Gleichstellung, der ibrische Knecht, geht nicht infolge solcher Verletzung aus. Sie sind ja nicht Leibeigene und der Nachlass ihrer wenigen Dienstjahre ist kein Äquivalent für die Verletzung ihres Körpers. Wie jedem andern ist ihnen der körperliche Verlust zu ersetzen, ihr Dienstverhältnis dauert fort, und das ibrische Mädchen hat ungeachtet der erlittenen Verstümmlung, oder vielmehr eben in Folge derselben noch zuverlässiger zu erwarten, dass der Herr, seiner eingegangenen eventuellen Zusage gemäß, es heiraten werde.

The words: "she does not leave like the male slaves," refer to the seventh year. If the master marries the maidservant her status is changed automatically, i.e. she will never leave her master unless he dies or divorces her. This is why the Torah discusses what happens if her master fails to marry her (verse 8). The sequence of the wording there is difficult; we could not have understood the first half of the verse, "if she does not please her master," unless we had been informed that it refers to her master displaying his displeasure by not marrying her.. Why did the Torah not write: "if the master does not marry her for she was displeasing in his eyes?" According to our approach the wording in the verse is fully justified, however, seeing the words לא תצא refer to a possible marriage, i.e. a permanent relationship. Concerning such a relationship the Torah adds that if for some reason the master finds this relationship no longer acceptable because she displeases him, אם רעה בעיני אדוניה, then the restrictions to granting freedom that apply to a male slave do not apply to a maidservant. The wording also precludes the possible errors we referred to earlier of the male slave not leaving because of the Shmittah year or even the Jubilee year unless his six years service have been completed. The moment the Torah wrote: "if she displeases her master, etc.," it becomes clear that the nature of the displeasure concerns only the master's willingness to marry this maidservant. In Deut. 15,12 the Torah commences by comparing the law of the male Jewish servant to that of the maidservant. This comparison extends only to certain entitlements the Torah legislated for the male Jewish slave. Nowhere in that whole paragraph is there a word which would contradict the interpretation of our sages regarding the distinctions between the laws applying to a maidservant.

We are free to interpret the wording of the various verses as long as our interpretation does not conflict with the halachah, seeing these rulings are all of Sinaitic origin. It is clear from the wording in our verse that the ruling about a slave being freed because of certain injuries his master caused him, such as the loss of a tooth or an eye, applies only to Gentile slaves. The reason seems to be that a Jewish slave has the option to get financial compensation from his master for such injuries. The combined value of the various compensation payments may amount to more than the price he puts on obtaining his freedom early, depending on whether such an injury was suffered near the beginning of his term of service or near the end of the six years. A Gentile slave is not entitled to such compensation seeing his very body is owned by his master. The only way his master can compensate him for the injury caused is by foregoing his services henceforth.