Halakhah к Шофтим 4:5

It may also be inferred from the comments of Radbaz, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5, that he is of the opinion that a woman cannot be "accepted" for appointment or election to a position of communal leadership. Radbaz seeks to explain how it was possible for Deborah to have been appointed to the office of judge (as distinct from the question of how she could render decisions in particular cases brought before her). Radbaz records several arguments advanced by Tosafot in answering the question of how Deborah's decisions were binding in individual cases, but fails to cite the answer that she was "accepted" by the populace. The omission of this argument is significant. Radbaz obviously maintains that "acceptance" does not vitiate the prohibition against women holding communal office.¹⁴Cf., R. Ya‘akov Levinson, Shivayon ha-Nashim, pp. 18ff. Rabbi Yisrael Ze'ev Minzberg also argues vigorously that acceptance is a valid procedure only on an ad hoc basis but cannot validate permanent or prolonged incumbency in office. He notes that the phrase "som tasim," from which the prohibition is derived, refers explicitly to induction into office and asserts that there can be no "acceptance" when a transgression is involved. Rabbi Levinson resolves the question with regard to Deborah's functions as a judge by noting that Scripture carefully states, "… and the children of Israel went up to her for judgment" (Judges 4:5) indicating that Deborah did not occupy an official position but that each such act was spontaneous and voluntary on the part of the litigants.