Kaisipang Hudyo sa Genesis 15:13: Akeidat Yitzchak, Netzach Yisrael, Derashot HaRan & Eight Chapters

Just as man, despite his freedom to move within the confines of the earth, cannot move outside of it, so he cannot interfere with the laws of nature G-d has established, despite the free will that has been granted to him. Man's limitations are evident in three areas. Let us illustrate this. There are many necessary activities without which man would perish, i.e. provision of food, shelter, and clothing, all of which man pursues by choice, though his failure to pursue them would result in irreparable harm to himself. Secondly, there are activities which are undertaken under the influence of varying degrees of pressure, such as business trips to foreign countries, which though freely decided upon, have not really been initiated by the traveller's own free will. Thirdly, there are activities which man wishes to initiate but is prevented from executing due to the limitations placed upon him by the will of the Creator. Were man to aspire to travel to heaven, for instance, this is clearly impossible due to the nature of man and the universe, respectively. The limitation placed on man is consistent with the words of David in Psalms 33,10-11, "G-d destroys the counsel of nations, whereas the counsel of the Almighty prevails forever." This teaches that the limitations placed on human freedom aim at ensuring that G-d’s universe should not be tampered with unduly by any of His creatures. Superficial consideration of these limitations might lead one to conclude that freedom of choice does not exist in reality. If one assumes that the whole is nothing more than the sum total of its parts, it follows that if the whole is to remain inviolate, so must the parts remain inviolate. We have discussed this in Chapter twenty-two and twenty-six, and have demonstrated that G-d’s will does not impose itself on human will. A prisoner who has the run of his prison, is free and responsible for his actions, though he cannot escape from the walls of the prison. The Torah illustrates the limits of such freedom by many stories, the Joseph story being a classic example in which all participants play their parts, executing their own designs, without G-d’s overall design becoming thwarted. On the other hand, the freedom of choice of none of the participants is interfered with in any way. This is the basis for the whole system of reward and punishment. Rabbi Yoshua ben Korcha in Tanchuma Vayeshev explains the verse, "Go and see G-d’s accomplishment. He is terrifying in His acts above the sons of man" (Psalms 66,4) to mean that man has a habit of blaming his mistakes on G-d. A husband who wants to divorce his wife, for instance, asks her to pour him a cup of wine. She complies, whereupon he gives her a bill of divorce claiming that the wine had been lukewarm. The wife queries, "How did you know beforehand that I was going to give you lukewarm wine?" Similarly, we say to G-d, "You have predetermined our death, since it says in Your Torah, which had been written prior to the creation of man "this is the law of the Torah; when man dies in a tent etc" (Numbers 19,2). This clearly means that death is part of the scheme of things. The truth is, of course, the reverse. Although, in the final analysis G-d’s plan will prevail, no one has been forced to play a particular part on the stage of history. Is it conceivable that because of an extra strand of dyed wool in Joseph's garment a whole people should have become condemned to exile in Egypt? G-d wanted to carry out the prophecy made to Abraham at the covenant between the pieces. The chain of events in which the jealousy of Joseph's brothers played a prominent part ultimately proves to have become the instrument for carrying out G-d’s design. However, G-d could have found many other means to achieve the same end. Therefore, the brothers cannot claim exoneration by saying that what they had done, helped G-d to achieve His aim. The Bible is full of similar such lessons. The Joseph story with all its details would be completely superfluous were it not for the fact that it foreshadowed Jewish experiences in general.

Yet one may strive to understand why the generation of Jews in Egypt was subjected to such a cruel fate at the hands of the Egyptians and Pharaoh. Especially, are we entitled to do so, since scripture does not offer a list of specific wrongdoings of the people? The author rejects many solutions offered by his predecessors as being inadequate. Most of those explanations would violate the principle of our freedom of choice in one form or another. The author insists that statements such as "he went down to Egypt," ((Deut. 26,5) or "and Jacob and his sons went down to Egypt," (Joshua 24,4) have to be understood at face value, and confirm that the move to Egypt was entirely voluntary, not pre­ordained in any way. It is interesting that throughout the events leading up to the arrival of Jacob in Egypt, G-d ascribes all happenings to Himself, except this last one (compare Joshua 24,3): "I took your father, I multiplied his seed, I gave him Isaac. I gave Jacob to Isaac,” but "Jacob and his sons went down to Egypt."The statement G-d made to Jacob while the latter was on his way to Egypt (Genesis 46,3), "Do not be afraid to go down to Egypt," is to be understood as permission, as an assurance of G-d’s continued support. Just as the spies Moses had sent out to check out the land of Canaan were not prevented from setting out on their mission (Numbers Chapter 13), so Jacob was not prevented from going down to Egypt. According to all this, the statement on the occasion of the covenant between the pieces (Genesis 15,13), "Know that your seed will be a stranger in a land that is not theirs etc.," was simply a piece of information to Abraham, not an evil decree. The Torah, by not stating that this occurrence would be due to Divine intervention, as could have been implied by such statements as "I will make them strangers" or "I will bring them down to Egypt," draws our attention to the fact that this was merely an announcement of an event in the future, but was not a decree. The most difficult example in the series dealing with the apparent suspension of free will is the repeated statement by G-d, "I will harden the heart of Pharaoh" or "I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh," as found in the chapters dealing with the ten plagues (Exodus Chapters 4-10). On the other hand, we find that repentance by even the worst sinners is readily accepted, such as the repentance of Achav and Menashe, son of Chiskiyahu (compare Kings I 16 and Kings I 21, Kings II 21, Chronicles II 33,13). The Bible describes those two as being wicked par excellence; yet in the case of Pharaoh it seems that whenever he began to repent, obstacles were placed in his way to prevent him from repenting effectively. The author argues against Maimonides's view (Hilchot Teshuvah 6) that wickedness is cumulative, so that at some point the sinner forfeits his right to free will. The author feels that the repeated missions to Pharaoh by Moses would have been wasted, had they not been intended to produce a change of heart in Pharaoh. Also, since G-d had already told Moses at the burning bush (Exodus 3, 19) that Pharaoh would not release the Israelites of his own accord, this had been prior to any mention having been made that "I will harden his heart."

The Sages hinted towards this idea, in their wisdom, in Midrash Bereishit Rabbah (44:18) [on the double language in the verse] "G-d said to Avram you shall surely know [lit: it is known, you will know]" (Gen 15:13)" [The Midrash says:] "(1) It is known that I will disperse them, you will know that I will gather them in. (2) It is known that I will pawn them, you will know that I will reclaim them. (3) It is known that I will subjugate them, you will know that I will redeem them." This Midrash did not need to express all three of these ideas, because they are all one concept. It would have been enough for them to express [only the third one] "It is known that I will subjugate them, you will know that I will redeem them" Because this is the essence which records that, in any case, that He will redeem Am Yisrael. So why did they need to mention also the idea of (1) gathering in and (2) reclaiming? The [Sages] wanted to express that by this double expression the exile and redemption are hinted at. The exile is referred to by the expression "it is known" and the redemption by the expression "you will know" in the future tense. They explain [that G-d is saying] "it is known that I disperse them, you will know that I will gather them in". Because dispersal is not according to the order of existence - that a single entity, like the People of Israel which is one people, should be dispersed, as has been explained already, that things which are one are together also. And [the Sages say] "it is known that I will pawn them" meaning that I will put them under the authority of others, and it is not appropriate according to the order of existence that the People of Israel should stand under any other sovereignty. Because when the People of Israel are in another land, they leave behind their own sovereignty and stand under the authority of another. Like a pawned object which is situated in the domain of someone other than its owner. So with the People of Israel, who should not, according to the order of existence, be under the government of others, and that others should be subjugating them, because it was not for this that they were created. Therefore, "by it being known that I will subjugate them, you will know that I will redeem them" - take them out of the subjugation. Because He is the One who ordered existence, it is impossible that something which comes from Him should depart from that order. Rather something temporary arising out of the happening of a sin, because something which is a temporary punishment because of sin is not called a departure from the order of existence. But for such a state of affairs to continue forever cannot be, because you will not find anything which departs from the natural order which sustains. Similarly when [the Sages] said "it is known that I will subjugate them, you will know that I will redeem them", it is because the subjugation of one nation by another is not in accordance with the order of existence as it should be, because it should be that every nation is free. This we have discussed at length in my book "Gevurot Hashem" (Chap 35) on the verse "This month shall be for you the first of months" (Ex 12:2) q.v. Thus has been explained by these three ideas [being out of place, dispersal, and subjugation] that one can come to an understanding of redemption from [understanding] exile.