כִּ֣י לֹ֤א מַחְשְׁבוֹתַי֙ מַחְשְׁב֣וֹתֵיכֶ֔ם וְלֹ֥א דַרְכֵיכֶ֖ם דְּרָכָ֑י נְאֻ֖ם יְהוָֽה׃
Sapagkat ang Aking mga isipin ay hindi ninyo mga isipin, at ang inyong mga lakad ay hindi Aking mga lakad, sabi ng Walang-Hanggan.
Kli Yakar
And the Lord regretted that He made man on earth. [This refers to man] in combination with the earth, as I explained in the name of the Ramban on the verse, Let us make man — myself and the earth — because the earth provided him with coarse and thick material. The matter of this regret and the concept of He was saddened to His heart is an extremely deep exposition — who can fathom it? All the scholars have extensively discussed it according to their understanding, this one saying one thing and that one saying another, and it is as if they are prophesying. Similarly, there are many matters in the Torah that are sealed and closed, regarding all of which my heart tells me not to elaborate on these expositions, for the human intellect becomes weary trying to grasp them. All these uncertainties come to us because we attempt to compare His blessed knowledge to our knowledge, but Scripture says the opposite: For My thoughts are not your thoughts (Isaiah 55:8). How can we possibly comprehend His blessed thoughts which are unknown to us, and we do not have the ability to evaluate them?
Tosafot Yom Tov
BECAUSE YOU DROWNED SOMEONE, YOU WERE DROWNED, AND THOSE WHO DROWNED YOU WILL IN THE END THEMSELVES DROWN. One might ask, if we follow the chain back to its starting point, won’t we find that the first one to have been killed did not kill anyone himself? Indeed, Abel, who was killed by Cain, hadn’t killed anyone. If so, how did Hillel know that it was on account of drowning someone else that this person had been drowned?
The second part of his saying, “and those who drowned you will in the end themselves drown,” is even more difficult, as this is not necessarily so! We regularly encounter cases of murderers who die in their beds at the hands of Heaven. [*I saw this question raised in Devarim Rabbah to parashat Va’Etchanan (2:25), discussing the verse “he who spills man’s blood, his blood will be spilled by man” (Genesis 9:6): R. Levi said: but are there not many men who kill and yet die in their beds? They answered him: the meaning of “his blood will be spilled by man” is that when that man arrives in the future world, at that point his blood will be spilled. As for the first question, concerning the first part of the mishna, I saw this mishna brought in the Talmud in tractate Sukkah 53a, and there Rashi explains that the body was thrown into the water and Hillel recognized him as a murderer.]
In Rashi’s commentary to our tractate, he notes that in some places people do not recite this mishna. But Rambam, Rav, and all the other commentators have it in their texts.
Midrash Shmuel, in answer to the second question, explains that “in the end” in the phrase “in the end they themselves will drown” means that through reincarnation, which is an established belief not only of the Sages but also of Pythagoras [and the rest of the wise of the nations, whom Abarbanel mentions in his commentary to parashat Ki Tetze], he eventually will end up drowning. And he gives a rather forced answer to the first question, saying that the case of Abel is different because the Sages say that he “gazed at holiness,” and Hillel, upon seeing this skull, assumed that it was that of a murderer, and not one who “gazed,” because murder is more common than this gazing.
In my opinion, it is totally untenable to claim that Hillel said something that could only be understood through the doctrine of reincarnation, which is an esoteric doctrine, and which ought to be concealed from all but the select few that G-d calls upon. And Rabbi Yehudah HaNassi, the redactor of the Mishna, would not have put this dictum into our mishna. For just as a verse in the Tanakh must always be readable in its plain sense, in addition to whatever other meanings it may harbor, the words of a mishna must always be readable in the plain way that all understand. And if there were only a kabbalistic interpretation to this mishna, Rabbi Yehudah HaNassi would have left it an oral teaching, along with the other kabbalistic teachings that remained oral and were not inluded in the Mishna.
Besides, the mishnayot seem to be out of order. For since this is merely something that Hillel said on a particular occasion, it shouldn’t have been included among the other mishnayot, which are all of the “he used to say” type, i.e. ethical teachings that were constantly being emphasized, and should rather have been appended to the end of this series of mishnayot. All the more so since this mishna is in Aramaic and shouldn’t come between two mishnayot that are in Hebrew.
Also, Hillel is speaking in the second person, directing his words towards the skull itself. Why wouldn’t he have turned towards his listeners and addressed them? He should have said “because he drowned someone, he was drowned, and those who drowned him will in the end themselves drown.”
Also, what is the meaning of the modifier af—“even, also”— here?
It seems that the mishna intends the following. Hillel taught in the previous mishna that an unlearned person cannot be one who fears sin and so on, in order to steer people clear of personal deficiencies. He also once saw a skull, etc., and from that experience onwards he used to say “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.” in the next mishna, which is another list of personal deficiencies and virtues.
This is because when he saw this skull, he said to it, “because you drowned someone, etc.”, i.e. one would think it only logical that because you drowned someone, you were drowned, and those who drowned you will in the end themselves drown, because “the measure one uses to dole out is the one used to dole out to him” (Sotah 1:7), for this is only proper and logical. But regardless of what should be, reality contradicts this hypothesis; many people who have never killed anyone are killed and many people kill others and are not themselves killed.
In order to bring reality into harmony with theory, so that it doesn’t contradict the logical necessity that everything ultimately comes about through one consistent system and is judged fairly, he used to say from that moment on that “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.” in order to accustom people to thinking that everything is truly necessary and just. For one does find, overall, that “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.”, regarding defiencies, and “increasing Torah increases life, etc.”, regarding virtues. It is evident, then, that the laws in place in the world are just and perfect, and we can infer from cases that are clearly just to those whose justness is concealed, and understood only by G-d; those, too, are based on what is righteous and just, as per the verse, “For my thoughts are not as your thoughts, nor are my ways like your ways” (Isaiah 55:8).
It follows, then, that Hillel did not say “because you drowned someone, etc.” because he felt it was certainly true, i.e. that of necessity this is what happened and what will happen, but as a first premise, that logic would dictate that this be so. But because there are well-known cases that contradict this, and these might cause a person to say that “there is no judgement and no judge,” Hillel began to regularly propagate his teaching that “increasing the flesh only increases worms… increasing Torah increases life, etc.” among the people. The intent is that we should use our experiences and sound judgment to conclude that just as in these cases the result follows logically from the action, whether for good or ill, so also what befalls people in general follows logically, though it is beyond our understanding.
Since the words “because you have drowned someone, etc.” are not an absolute statement describing what will happen with certainty, as it is possible that this drowned person had not drowned anybody and that the one who drowned him might not be drowned, Hillel did not utter them as a public teaching. While facing the skull, an unhearing piece of bone, he said to himself that what ought to be is that “because you drowned someone, etc.”
And the fact of reality contradicting this statement is also not at all explicit, but is implicit in his following dictum, that from this point on he used to say “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.,” which the discerning will understand well as addressing this point. All such things ought to be said in such a manner as to be apparent to the discerning scholar but not to all those listening, lest they who will not understand the answer “decide by what their ears hear” and “judge by what their eyes see” (Isaiah 11:3) that the question is truly difficult and has no answer, and remain confounded by it and thereby falter, G-d forbid.
Hillel said these words in Aramaic, the language of the masses at the time per the mishna in Shekalim 5:3, because he said them as though speaking to the skull of a bandit. He also did this so that the people should take his words at face value, that it is indeed the case that “because you drowned somebody, etc.,” and for the discerning students he explained his words by affixing to them the dictum “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.,” which he said in Hebrew. This is what seems correct to me.
The second part of his saying, “and those who drowned you will in the end themselves drown,” is even more difficult, as this is not necessarily so! We regularly encounter cases of murderers who die in their beds at the hands of Heaven. [*I saw this question raised in Devarim Rabbah to parashat Va’Etchanan (2:25), discussing the verse “he who spills man’s blood, his blood will be spilled by man” (Genesis 9:6): R. Levi said: but are there not many men who kill and yet die in their beds? They answered him: the meaning of “his blood will be spilled by man” is that when that man arrives in the future world, at that point his blood will be spilled. As for the first question, concerning the first part of the mishna, I saw this mishna brought in the Talmud in tractate Sukkah 53a, and there Rashi explains that the body was thrown into the water and Hillel recognized him as a murderer.]
In Rashi’s commentary to our tractate, he notes that in some places people do not recite this mishna. But Rambam, Rav, and all the other commentators have it in their texts.
Midrash Shmuel, in answer to the second question, explains that “in the end” in the phrase “in the end they themselves will drown” means that through reincarnation, which is an established belief not only of the Sages but also of Pythagoras [and the rest of the wise of the nations, whom Abarbanel mentions in his commentary to parashat Ki Tetze], he eventually will end up drowning. And he gives a rather forced answer to the first question, saying that the case of Abel is different because the Sages say that he “gazed at holiness,” and Hillel, upon seeing this skull, assumed that it was that of a murderer, and not one who “gazed,” because murder is more common than this gazing.
In my opinion, it is totally untenable to claim that Hillel said something that could only be understood through the doctrine of reincarnation, which is an esoteric doctrine, and which ought to be concealed from all but the select few that G-d calls upon. And Rabbi Yehudah HaNassi, the redactor of the Mishna, would not have put this dictum into our mishna. For just as a verse in the Tanakh must always be readable in its plain sense, in addition to whatever other meanings it may harbor, the words of a mishna must always be readable in the plain way that all understand. And if there were only a kabbalistic interpretation to this mishna, Rabbi Yehudah HaNassi would have left it an oral teaching, along with the other kabbalistic teachings that remained oral and were not inluded in the Mishna.
Besides, the mishnayot seem to be out of order. For since this is merely something that Hillel said on a particular occasion, it shouldn’t have been included among the other mishnayot, which are all of the “he used to say” type, i.e. ethical teachings that were constantly being emphasized, and should rather have been appended to the end of this series of mishnayot. All the more so since this mishna is in Aramaic and shouldn’t come between two mishnayot that are in Hebrew.
Also, Hillel is speaking in the second person, directing his words towards the skull itself. Why wouldn’t he have turned towards his listeners and addressed them? He should have said “because he drowned someone, he was drowned, and those who drowned him will in the end themselves drown.”
Also, what is the meaning of the modifier af—“even, also”— here?
It seems that the mishna intends the following. Hillel taught in the previous mishna that an unlearned person cannot be one who fears sin and so on, in order to steer people clear of personal deficiencies. He also once saw a skull, etc., and from that experience onwards he used to say “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.” in the next mishna, which is another list of personal deficiencies and virtues.
This is because when he saw this skull, he said to it, “because you drowned someone, etc.”, i.e. one would think it only logical that because you drowned someone, you were drowned, and those who drowned you will in the end themselves drown, because “the measure one uses to dole out is the one used to dole out to him” (Sotah 1:7), for this is only proper and logical. But regardless of what should be, reality contradicts this hypothesis; many people who have never killed anyone are killed and many people kill others and are not themselves killed.
In order to bring reality into harmony with theory, so that it doesn’t contradict the logical necessity that everything ultimately comes about through one consistent system and is judged fairly, he used to say from that moment on that “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.” in order to accustom people to thinking that everything is truly necessary and just. For one does find, overall, that “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.”, regarding defiencies, and “increasing Torah increases life, etc.”, regarding virtues. It is evident, then, that the laws in place in the world are just and perfect, and we can infer from cases that are clearly just to those whose justness is concealed, and understood only by G-d; those, too, are based on what is righteous and just, as per the verse, “For my thoughts are not as your thoughts, nor are my ways like your ways” (Isaiah 55:8).
It follows, then, that Hillel did not say “because you drowned someone, etc.” because he felt it was certainly true, i.e. that of necessity this is what happened and what will happen, but as a first premise, that logic would dictate that this be so. But because there are well-known cases that contradict this, and these might cause a person to say that “there is no judgement and no judge,” Hillel began to regularly propagate his teaching that “increasing the flesh only increases worms… increasing Torah increases life, etc.” among the people. The intent is that we should use our experiences and sound judgment to conclude that just as in these cases the result follows logically from the action, whether for good or ill, so also what befalls people in general follows logically, though it is beyond our understanding.
Since the words “because you have drowned someone, etc.” are not an absolute statement describing what will happen with certainty, as it is possible that this drowned person had not drowned anybody and that the one who drowned him might not be drowned, Hillel did not utter them as a public teaching. While facing the skull, an unhearing piece of bone, he said to himself that what ought to be is that “because you drowned someone, etc.”
And the fact of reality contradicting this statement is also not at all explicit, but is implicit in his following dictum, that from this point on he used to say “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.,” which the discerning will understand well as addressing this point. All such things ought to be said in such a manner as to be apparent to the discerning scholar but not to all those listening, lest they who will not understand the answer “decide by what their ears hear” and “judge by what their eyes see” (Isaiah 11:3) that the question is truly difficult and has no answer, and remain confounded by it and thereby falter, G-d forbid.
Hillel said these words in Aramaic, the language of the masses at the time per the mishna in Shekalim 5:3, because he said them as though speaking to the skull of a bandit. He also did this so that the people should take his words at face value, that it is indeed the case that “because you drowned somebody, etc.,” and for the discerning students he explained his words by affixing to them the dictum “increasing the flesh only increases worms, etc.,” which he said in Hebrew. This is what seems correct to me.
Tosafot Yom Tov
TEN THINGS WERE CREATED AT THE DUSK OF THE SABBATH, AND THEY ARE: THE MOUTH OF THE EARTH, ETC. Rambam: the Sages do not believe that G-d’s will is renewed every moment. Rather, when He first created things he made their natures such that whatever should happen to them will happen, whether that should be something constant, which we call natural, or some unusual thing that happens infrequently, which we call miraculous. They therefore said that on the sixth day He put it into the nature of the earth that Korach and his followers should be swallowed up by it, into the nature of the well that it should give forth water, into the nature of the donkey that she should speak, and so on. One might object that if all miracles were implanted into the nature of things during the six days of creation, why does the mishna single out these ten things? You should know, in answer to this, that they did not single them out because no miracles other than these were implanted into the nature of things. They meant simply that these were the only things that were put in during dusk, whereas the other miracles were put into the nature of things from the very beginning, at the moment they were made. They would say, for example, that when the waters were divided on the second day, it was made part of their nature that the Red Sea should part for Moses, and the Jordan for Joshua and Elisha. And when the sun was created on the fourth day, it was made part of its nature that it should stop in its orbit at a given time when spoken to by Joshua. This is so for all other miracles aside from these ten, which were put into the nature of those things during dusk.
He clarifies this further in his book the Guide for the Perplexed, 2:29. There, after quoting the midrash that says G-d stipulated with the sea that it should split for Israel and with all of what was created during the six days similarly (Bereshit Rabbah 5:5), he concludes: when G-d has a prophet perform a sign he tells him the moment at which what he is saying will come to pass, and it happens in accordance with the nature that was implanted into the thing.
But there is great difficulty with this position, for Moses said to Pharaoh, “for what time should I entreat for you… to excise the frogs” (Exodus 8:5), and Isaiah said, “request a sign from Hashem, your G-d, request it in the depths or high above” (Isaiah 7:11). And Gideon’s request of the sign with the wool involved two opposing possibilities (Judges 6:36). Midrash Shmuel writes in the name of Meiri that the Sages do not believe that these stipulations the midrash refers to were made in the permanent nature of the thing that was acted upon; they were undoubtedly speaking from the perspective of the Actor and His will. They mean to say that there was no change in His will, G-d forbid, for at the moment that He created the heavens and the earth and all that is within them His knowledge encompassed and included all of the things that would happen in the future; He knew that there would come a point at which He would change the nature of a particular created thing, and He created it with that in mind. The act of the miracle, therefore, was not a change in His knowledge or a new element in His will, etc.
This means that all the signs were created and done at that particular moment in time, and were not implanted into nature such that they should come into existence and be done at that moment. And although His knowledge already encompassed them we have already noted above on the mishna of “all is seen”, 3:15, that His knowledge does not turn the possible into the necessary. As such, all miracles depend on what a person chooses from among the things that are possible, as they are all done for people.
And I say that, just as Rambam resolves the paradox of “all is seen, but permission is given” using the verse “for My thoughts are not your thoughts” (Isaiah 55:8), as I wrote on the mishna at 3:15, I will likewise answer that the end of that verse itself is the resolution of the great paradox inherent in the subject of miracles. For there is no change in His will, which is the meaning of the end of the verse, “and your ways are not My ways” (ibid.). His “ways” are His actions, as Moses said, “make Your ways known to me” (Exodus 33:13), which are His actions and administration of the world. When Isaiah says “your ways are not My ways” he means that you should not understand My ways in terms of your ways, and then this great paradox will not arise. Rambam himself writes in the Guide for the Perplexed at the end of 3:20: the terms supervision, knowledge, and intent when said of G-d are not the same as when said of us. When these different kinds of supervision, knowledge, and intent are conflated and treated as though they are the same, the abovementioned paradoxes arise. But when it becomes clear that whatever is said of us differs from what is said of Him, the truth becomes clear. And the prophet told us of the difference between the things said of Him and of us when he said “and your ways are not My ways.”
It also seems from his language in the above-quoted segment from Guide for the Perplexed 2:29210There, Rambam calls the words of the midrash “strange,” though a better translation might be “extroardinary.” that although he explains the opinion of the Sages that way, it is not his own. It suffices for us that we have rescued Rambam, at least as far as his own opinion, even if we cannot rescue him regarding the opinion he attributes to the Sages.
But I say that the opinion of Meiri is that of the Sages as well and is not foreign to them, G-d forbid—it emerges clearly from explicit verses in the Tanach which every elementary schooler knows. When they say these things were created at the dusk of the Sabbath they are speaking only of His knowledge, like the mishna of “all is seen”, as Meiri says. As for their saying that G-d stipulated with the sea during the six days of creation that it should split, I feel that this is not at all about refuting the notion of a change in His will. Rather, this dictum is of the same tenor as the one on the verse “on the sixth day” that I quoted earlier in my commentary to 2:8, which says that G-d stipulated with all of creation that it only continue if the Jewish people accept the five books of the Torah. This has nothing to do with the nature of the created things, and speaks rather about the purpose of the creation of the world, which was only created for the Jewish people to receive the Torah; should they not accept it, the world will return to “formlessness and void”, for it was only created for this purpose. All of the conditions mentioned in the midrash were said in the same vein, using language that emphasized the merit and great importance of Israel. G-d stipulated with the sea during creation that it part for Israel, as it is for that purpose that He created the sea; and with the sun that is stand still for Joshua, as it is for that purpose that it was created.
They thus conveyed to us one of the fundamentals of faith: that everything was created solely for Israel, which accords with the midrash that says “ ‘In the beginning’—for the sake of Israel, who are called ‘the beginning’ “ (Vayikra Rabbah 36:4) and numerous other dicta that speak the praises and merits of Israel. Now we do not deny that, in saying this, they also meant that He knows the conclusions of things at their beginnings and sees the end of something from the very first moment, but only insofar as this is the nature of His knowledge, as in “all is seen”. But it was not their primary intent to rid us of the mistaken notion that His will and knowledge are subject to change, for they never entertained these ideas to begin with, as Isaiah the prophet already removed the confusion surrounding this by saying “My thoughts are not your thoughts, and your ways are not My ways,” meaning that they are not to be compared at all, which will prevent us from falling into the paradox. And in using the language “G-d stipulated” they meant the same thing as the midrash on “the sixth day”.
Our master Maharal offers “wondrous counsel and great wisdom” (cf. Isaiah 28:29) in Derech Chaim to negate this question altogether. He says that “knowledge” and “ability” and such are all actions of G-d, just as “and G-d knew” (Exodus 2:25) was an action of G-d. Just as the other actions attributed to Him do not necessitate a change or plurality within Him, neither do these, and in these matters we rely on the Kabbalah. See there.
He clarifies this further in his book the Guide for the Perplexed, 2:29. There, after quoting the midrash that says G-d stipulated with the sea that it should split for Israel and with all of what was created during the six days similarly (Bereshit Rabbah 5:5), he concludes: when G-d has a prophet perform a sign he tells him the moment at which what he is saying will come to pass, and it happens in accordance with the nature that was implanted into the thing.
But there is great difficulty with this position, for Moses said to Pharaoh, “for what time should I entreat for you… to excise the frogs” (Exodus 8:5), and Isaiah said, “request a sign from Hashem, your G-d, request it in the depths or high above” (Isaiah 7:11). And Gideon’s request of the sign with the wool involved two opposing possibilities (Judges 6:36). Midrash Shmuel writes in the name of Meiri that the Sages do not believe that these stipulations the midrash refers to were made in the permanent nature of the thing that was acted upon; they were undoubtedly speaking from the perspective of the Actor and His will. They mean to say that there was no change in His will, G-d forbid, for at the moment that He created the heavens and the earth and all that is within them His knowledge encompassed and included all of the things that would happen in the future; He knew that there would come a point at which He would change the nature of a particular created thing, and He created it with that in mind. The act of the miracle, therefore, was not a change in His knowledge or a new element in His will, etc.
This means that all the signs were created and done at that particular moment in time, and were not implanted into nature such that they should come into existence and be done at that moment. And although His knowledge already encompassed them we have already noted above on the mishna of “all is seen”, 3:15, that His knowledge does not turn the possible into the necessary. As such, all miracles depend on what a person chooses from among the things that are possible, as they are all done for people.
And I say that, just as Rambam resolves the paradox of “all is seen, but permission is given” using the verse “for My thoughts are not your thoughts” (Isaiah 55:8), as I wrote on the mishna at 3:15, I will likewise answer that the end of that verse itself is the resolution of the great paradox inherent in the subject of miracles. For there is no change in His will, which is the meaning of the end of the verse, “and your ways are not My ways” (ibid.). His “ways” are His actions, as Moses said, “make Your ways known to me” (Exodus 33:13), which are His actions and administration of the world. When Isaiah says “your ways are not My ways” he means that you should not understand My ways in terms of your ways, and then this great paradox will not arise. Rambam himself writes in the Guide for the Perplexed at the end of 3:20: the terms supervision, knowledge, and intent when said of G-d are not the same as when said of us. When these different kinds of supervision, knowledge, and intent are conflated and treated as though they are the same, the abovementioned paradoxes arise. But when it becomes clear that whatever is said of us differs from what is said of Him, the truth becomes clear. And the prophet told us of the difference between the things said of Him and of us when he said “and your ways are not My ways.”
It also seems from his language in the above-quoted segment from Guide for the Perplexed 2:29210There, Rambam calls the words of the midrash “strange,” though a better translation might be “extroardinary.” that although he explains the opinion of the Sages that way, it is not his own. It suffices for us that we have rescued Rambam, at least as far as his own opinion, even if we cannot rescue him regarding the opinion he attributes to the Sages.
But I say that the opinion of Meiri is that of the Sages as well and is not foreign to them, G-d forbid—it emerges clearly from explicit verses in the Tanach which every elementary schooler knows. When they say these things were created at the dusk of the Sabbath they are speaking only of His knowledge, like the mishna of “all is seen”, as Meiri says. As for their saying that G-d stipulated with the sea during the six days of creation that it should split, I feel that this is not at all about refuting the notion of a change in His will. Rather, this dictum is of the same tenor as the one on the verse “on the sixth day” that I quoted earlier in my commentary to 2:8, which says that G-d stipulated with all of creation that it only continue if the Jewish people accept the five books of the Torah. This has nothing to do with the nature of the created things, and speaks rather about the purpose of the creation of the world, which was only created for the Jewish people to receive the Torah; should they not accept it, the world will return to “formlessness and void”, for it was only created for this purpose. All of the conditions mentioned in the midrash were said in the same vein, using language that emphasized the merit and great importance of Israel. G-d stipulated with the sea during creation that it part for Israel, as it is for that purpose that He created the sea; and with the sun that is stand still for Joshua, as it is for that purpose that it was created.
They thus conveyed to us one of the fundamentals of faith: that everything was created solely for Israel, which accords with the midrash that says “ ‘In the beginning’—for the sake of Israel, who are called ‘the beginning’ “ (Vayikra Rabbah 36:4) and numerous other dicta that speak the praises and merits of Israel. Now we do not deny that, in saying this, they also meant that He knows the conclusions of things at their beginnings and sees the end of something from the very first moment, but only insofar as this is the nature of His knowledge, as in “all is seen”. But it was not their primary intent to rid us of the mistaken notion that His will and knowledge are subject to change, for they never entertained these ideas to begin with, as Isaiah the prophet already removed the confusion surrounding this by saying “My thoughts are not your thoughts, and your ways are not My ways,” meaning that they are not to be compared at all, which will prevent us from falling into the paradox. And in using the language “G-d stipulated” they meant the same thing as the midrash on “the sixth day”.
Our master Maharal offers “wondrous counsel and great wisdom” (cf. Isaiah 28:29) in Derech Chaim to negate this question altogether. He says that “knowledge” and “ability” and such are all actions of G-d, just as “and G-d knew” (Exodus 2:25) was an action of G-d. Just as the other actions attributed to Him do not necessitate a change or plurality within Him, neither do these, and in these matters we rely on the Kabbalah. See there.