Mga Sanggunian sa Talmud para sa Levitico 19:12: Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”⁵We do not talk here about judicial oaths which by necessity are about past events, but “blurted oaths”. How can a statement about past events ever lead to a variable sacrifice? For a future directed oath it is possible that he had the honest intention of keeping what he swore to but later he forgot. But for the past we must assume that he knows what he did.? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath⁶Under the right conditions he can be punished for it, but there can be no atoning sacrifice.. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice⁷A sacrifice is possible only for an inadvertent sin. In this context, “inadvertent” may mean that the perpetrator was not aware that his act was criminal or sinful, or that he was not aware that the act if inadvertent requires a sacrifice.. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted⁸A statement qualifies as an oath only if it is pronounced as such, not as a simple statement.. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice⁷A sacrifice is possible only for an inadvertent sin. In this context, “inadvertent” may mean that the perpetrator was not aware that his act was criminal or sinful, or that he was not aware that the act if inadvertent requires a sacrifice.. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan⁹Terumot7:1 Notes 5,6; Šabbat11:5 (13b), Ketubot3:1 Note 30, Bava Qamma7:2 Note 29; Babli Šabbat69a.: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice¹⁰Sacrifices are possible only for inadvertent deadly sins. If a person knew that eating fat was forbidden but did not know that it was a deadly sin, he simultaneously committed an intentional sin and an unintentional deadly sin. If he had been duly warned by two witnesses not to break the law, he can be flogged for the intentional sin and has to bring a sacrifice for the unintentional deadly sin even though there cannot be two penalties for one crime (Terumot7:1 Notes 19–70).. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael¹¹Who is R. Aqiba’s opponent. All of Mishnah 1 is R. Aqiba’s teaching. R. Ismael opposes adding backward looking oaths as blurted oaths. answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting¹²A future directed oath, where it cannot be verified instantly whether it will be kept or violated, is an actionless crime and cannot be prosecuted (cf. Note 3). The preconditions of a sacrifice for a blurted oath negate the possibility of judicial penalties.? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice¹³If R. Aqiba did accept R. Joḥanan’s argument, it would be possible for a person to be flogged for violating the prohibition of perjury (Lev. 19:12) and still be liable for a sacrifice. This would make R. Ismael’s objection irrelevant.? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There¹⁴If he denies that he intended or pronounced an oath, there is no oath and the entire discussion is irrelevant., if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else¹⁵He made the oath in good faith but his mind was distracted by other things. It is an inadvertent sin which qualifies for a sacrifice..

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? ⁷²Lev. 5:4. The causative refers to the future.Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail⁸³In the version of Sifra(Introduction1), in the list of the thirteen hermeneutical principles of R. Ismael one finds (5) a general statement followed by a detail, (6) a detail followed by a general statement, (7) a general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement you only argue following the pattern of the detail, (8) a general statement dependent on the detail, (9) a detail dependent on the general statement. Rules 8 and 9 mean that if the general statement can only be understood by the detail or vice versa, rules 5 and 6 do not apply. It then is explained in §7 that if a general statement is followed by a detail, only the detail is intended. §8: If a detail is followed by a general statement, the general statement adds to the detail. Examples are Lev. 1:2: From animals, from cattle, or from small cattle. This implies that sacrifices are restricted to cattle, sheep, or goats. Ex. 22:9: A donkey, an ox, a sheep, or any animal. The rules of caretakers apply to any animal. Then it becomes a problem how to treat a verse which contains general statement, detail, general statement, whether to apply rule 5 (eliminating the final general statement by rule 9), or rule 6 (eliminating the first general statement by rule 8), or rule 7. In the preceding derivation, the arguments have been suppressed that rules 8 and 9 do not apply and, therefore, only rule 7 is relevant. The standard example for an application of rule 7 is Deut. 14:26, about permitted uses of Second Tithe money at the place of the Sanctuary: You may spend the money for anything you desire(general), for cattle, or small cattle, or wine, or liquor(detail), or anything you wish(general). The common denominator of the items in the detail describes animal or vegetable food; Second Tithe money can be used for any food derived from animals (generated from semen) or plants (growing from seeds).
Since the first part of Lev. 5:4 fits Rule 7, it is clear that the rule applies not only to oaths intended to cause good or evil but to a larger set of oaths which, however, have to conform to the idea underlying “causing good or bad things”. Obviously one of the ideas is that events caused are later in time than the cause. This is R. Ismael’s interpretation of the verse. Babli 26a.. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? ⁸⁴Quote from the Mishnah.“He answered him, from the additional text of the verse^73,The continuation of the quote, anything which a person will blurt out in an oath, which seems to be superfluous since the sentence starts: Or a person who would swear blurting out with his lips. The addition indicates that the verse should not be interpreted narrowly. Cf. Note 83.⁸⁵This is not an additional argument. The additional text shows that the rule to be applied is rule 7, not rule 5. R. Aqiba follows a different system. For him the sentence structure is not general, detail, general but expansive, restrictive, expansive, which he reads as including everything except what is completely different from the detail quoted as restriction.. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other⁸⁶The text of R. Aqiba’s answer is the text of the Mishnah in the Babli. It is known that the separate Mishnah in the Yerushalmi is not from the Yerushalmi text. The Mishnah text in Maimonides’s autograph is that of the separate Yerushalmi Mishnah..” You cannot⁸⁷The Mishnah cannot be quoted as proof that R. Ismael conceded to R. Aqiba., as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael¹¹Who is R. Aqiba’s opponent. All of Mishnah 1 is R. Aqiba’s teaching. R. Ismael opposes adding backward looking oaths as blurted oaths. answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath¹²A future directed oath, where it cannot be verified instantly whether it will be kept or violated, is an actionless crime and cannot be prosecuted (cf. Note 3). The preconditions of a sacrifice for a blurted oath negate the possibility of judicial penalties.? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice¹³If R. Aqiba did accept R. Joḥanan’s argument, it would be possible for a person to be flogged for violating the prohibition of perjury (Lev. 19:12) and still be liable for a sacrifice. This would make R. Ismael’s objection irrelevant.? He said to him⁸⁸R. Aqiba to R. Ismael., do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written⁸⁹Since they are not mentioned in the verse. For לי נן read לֵי[ת אִי]נֻּן.? He told him⁹⁰R. Ismael to R. Aqiba., even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good⁹¹It is obvious from rule 7 that the obligation of a variable sacrifice for a blurted oath must hold for a larger set than “causing bad or good things”. The only problem is to define this larger set and the causative employed definitively excludes oaths regarding the past. The Tanna of the Mishnah cannot accept R. Ismael’s hermeneutical rules.? Therefore never for the past⁹²Since the oath is void, he is prevented from sacrificing if it was unintentional. If it was intentional he can be prosecuted for a vain oath, forbidden in the Ten Commandments..