Halakhah su Deuteronomio 20:19

Similarly,⁹⁷ Now Ibn Ezra brings other examples from Scripture where a phrase does not refer to what is adjacent to it in the verse but rather to a part of the verse that is some distance away. “from the first day until the seventh day” (Exodus 12:15)⁹⁸ The verse reads: “Seven days you shall eat unleavened bread, but on the first day you shall remove leaven from your homes, for whoever eats leavened bread will be cut off from Israel, from the first day until the seventh day.” Reading this verse literally, it gives the impression that one who eats leavened bread will be cut off from Israel for only seven days, from the first day of Passover until the seventh day. This is not a correct reading. is not connected to the adjacent phrase, rather to “whoever eats leavened bread etc.” (ibid.) which is some distance away.⁹⁹ The verse is to be understood as: “whoever eats leavened bread from the first day to the seventh day will be cut off from Israel.” Similarly, “and Israel saw Egypt dead upon the bank of the sea” (ibid. 14:30) is to be understood as “and Israel saw, while standing upon the bank of the sea, Egypt dead.” For “they went down like a stone into the depths” (ibid. 15:5), and “the earth swallowed them” (ibid. 15:12).¹⁰⁰ Therefore, verse 14:30 cannot mean that Israel saw Egypt’s dead upon the bank of the sea, since the Egyptian bodies sank and were not thrown upon the bank. Similarly, “to fall before you in siege” (Deuteronomy 20:19) is connected with “you may not cut it down” (ibid.).¹⁰¹ The verse is to be understood as: “you may not cut down the tree so that the city should fall before you in siege, for man is dependant on the tree of the field.” There are many similar verses.

When R. Phinehas ben Yair arrived at the home of R. Judah he happened to enter by a gate near which were some mules. He [R. Phinehas] exclaimed, "The angel of death is in this house! Shall I dine with him?" Rabbi [Judah] heard and went out to meet him. He said to him [R. Phinehas], "I will sell them." He [R. Phinehas] said to him [R. Judah], "Thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). "I shall abandon them." "You would be spreading danger." "I shall hamstring them." "That would cause suffering to animals." "I shall kill them." "There is a prohibition against wanton destruction" (Deuteronomy 20:19).

This ruling, cited in the name of Issur ve-Heter 59:36, is supported by the comments of Tosafot, Baba Mezi'a 32b.³⁴Cf., however, R. Elijah of Vilna, Bi‘ur ha-Gra, Even ha-Ezer 5:40, and the comments of R. Jacob Breisch, Teshuvot Ḥelkat Ya‘akov, I, no. 30, secs. 2-3, as well as Shmuel, Moshe Mordecai and Eleazar Shulsinger, Mishmar ha-Leviyim (Zikhron Me’ir, 5740), no. 20. See also R. Yechiel Ya‘akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, III, no. 7, and Ḥelkat Ya‘akov, I, no. 31, secs. 1-3.
R. Judah Leib Zirelson, Ma‘arkhei Lev, no. 110, finds a biblical source for this ruling: “And Samson went and caught three hundred foxes and took torches and turned tail to tail and put a torch in the midst between every two tails. And when he had set the torches on fire, he let them go into the standing corn of the Philistines and burn up both the shucks and the standing corn and also the olive-yards” (Judges 15:4-5). Ma‘arkhei Lev argues that inflicting severe pain on the foxes was sanctionable only because it served a human need and hence the general principle can be traced to these verses. R. Jacob Breisch, Teshuvot Ḥelkat Ya‘akov, I, no. 30, sec. 5, cogently rebuts this argument on the grounds that Samson was involved in a defensive war against the Philistines and, in fact, his own life was endangered. Hence Judges 15:4-5 serves only to establish that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is permitted when human life is endangered but not necessarily for the sake of a lesser purpose. Tosafot poses the following question: The Gemara, Avodah Zarah 11a, declares that, in conjunction with the funeral rites of a monarch, it is permitted to sever the tendons of the horse upon which the king rode. This practice is permitted despite its source in pagan rituals because it is intended as an act of homage to the deceased king. If za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim involves a biblical infraction, queries Tosafot, why may the animal be mutilated in this manner? Tosafot answers that such a practice is permitted "in honor of king[s] and prince[s] just as 'thou shalt not wantonly destroy' (Deuteronomy 20:19) is abrogated for the sake of their honor." Insofar as the prohibition concerning "wanton destruction" is concerned, Tosafot's comment is clear. The prohibition against "wanton destruction" is not suspended or abrogated for the sake of royal honor; rather, Scripture forbids only wanton destruction of fruit trees and, by extension, of other objects of value as well. Scripture does not forbid enjoyment of consumables since such use does not constitute "destruction." Similarly, "destruction" which serves a legitimate purpose is not proscribed since it is not wanton or "destructive" in nature. "Destruction" for purposes of rendering homage to a deceased monarch is a legitimate use of property and hence is not forbidden. Tosafot apparently regards za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim in a similar light, i.e., as forbidden only when wanton in nature,³⁵Cf. Teshuvot Mareh Yeḥezkel, no. 59, who expresses amazement at Rema’s ruling querying, “Whence is it derived that violation of the biblical prohibition of ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim may be sanctioned to effect a cure or for human benefit?” In light of Tosafot’s comments to the effect that the prohibition does not encompass such contingencies, Mareh Yeḥezkel’s incredulity is misplaced. but permissible when designed to achieve a legitimate goal.³⁶See below, note 50. Hence, declares Tosafot, mutilation of the royal steed in conjunction with the funeral of a monarch is permitted even though the animal experiences pain because mutilation of the animal serves to fulfill a legitimate purpose. In accordance with this position, Rema rules that za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim is permissible for purposes of healing or for any other legitimate purpose.³⁷See R. Abraham Hafuta, No‘am, IV (5721), 223f. Piskei Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 1:11, in what is apparently a precis of Tosafot, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, (or the precis of a different manuscript of Tosafot on Avodah Zarah) states that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is forbidden only when the pain caused to the animal yields “no profit” (beli revaḥ).