Halakhah su Deuteronomio 21:1

Likewise, we find that the nose is deemed to be the site of the soul's departure from the body with regard to the provisions surrounding the eglah arufah (the broken-necked heifer). Biblical law (Deut. 21:1–9) provides that if homicide is committed outside a city and the identity of the murderer is unknown it becomes incumbent upon the elders of the city closest to the site where the corpse is found to perform the ritual of breaking the neck of a calf in expiation of the untraced murder. In the event that the body be found in a spot virtually equidistant between two cities, the Mishnah, Sotah 45b, cites the opinion of R. Akiva who states that the distance to the neighboring cities is to be measured from the nose in order to determine which is closest. In explaining R. Akiva's opinion, which in this case is authoritative, the Gemara states that his view is predicated upon the premise that "primary life—ikar ḥiyuta—is in the nose." This would seem to indicate that death and cessation of respiration are synonymous.

Nevertheless, it appears that Rambam does maintain that circumstantial evidence may be admitted in administering "the king's justice." In his Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 40, Rambam unequivocally states that the king may act on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. In his discussion of the rationale underlying various mizvot, Rambam advances a novel view regarding the purpose of the commandment concerning "breaking the neck of a heifer" (Deut. 21:1-8), a ritual performed when a homicide victim is found outside the city limits and the perpetrator is unknown. The purpose of this rite, according to Rambam, is to publicize what has transpired so that anyone having information concerning the identity of the murderer will come forward. As Rambam states: "When the murderer is discovered, the benefit of the law is apparent for [even] if the Bet Din cannot sentence him to death the king may execute him, for the king may execute—be-amatla'ot u-be-de-dami (lit., by circumstances and by analogy)—on the basis of circumstantial evidence [emphasis supplied]; and if the king does not execute him the avenger of blood³³Rambam’s statement with regard to the king’s power is unequivocal; the king may execute on the basis of circumstantial evidence. His position with regard to the blood-avenger is less clear. There is no explicit statement declaring that the blood-avenger may act on the basis of circumstantial evidence. From the context it is, however, clear that he may act upon the testimony of a single witness, even of a woman. Earlier in the same paragraph Rambam states that the purpose of the heifer is achieved if even a single person, even a woman, comes forward. It is in that context, i.e., in the context of testimony by a single witness, that Rambam declares that the king or avenger of blood may put the murderer to death. The further statement regarding circumstantial evidence is added parenthetically in conjunction with Rambam’s reference to the prerogative of the king. Nevertheless on the basis of Or Sameaḥ’s equation of the king, the blood-avenger and Noachide courts, it would seem that both the blood-avenger and Noachide courts may impose capital punishment on the basis of circumstantial evidence. See also Encyclopedia Talmudit, V, 223, note 31. may scheme and plan his death, and at last kill him." Rambam's statement in the Guide with regard to circumstantial evidence in administering "the king's justice," was apparently overlooked by R. Chajes.

And that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 5:2) that the Torah believed one witness in two places: with a suspected adulteress (sotah), that she not drink the bitter waters; and with a beheaded calf, that it should not be beheaded - meaning to say, if one testifies that he knows about the killing of the one murdered, we do not behead the calf; as the Torah stated (Deuteronomy 21:1), "not known," but behold, it is known to one man. And the Sages believed one witness that testifies for a woman that her husband has died, so that she not be anchored (become an agunah that is not allowed to remarry). And they, may their memory be blessed, said as the reason of this that she is very exacting after the truth in this. As if she might perhaps marry [as a result] and her [first] husband come afterwards, she must exit from [both marriages], and the offspring [from the second] is a mamzer. And [also that which] they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 5:3) that in every place that the testimony of one witness is effective, the testimony of a woman or someone disqualified is also effective; except for the one witness of an oath, as we only obligate an oath with the testimony of one fit witness.