Halakhah su Deuteronomio 29:28

R. Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor, Ein Yizḥak, I, no. 8, resolves the issue raised by Havvot Ya'ir but in doing so he severely limits the ambit of the principle hal'itehu la-rasha. Ein Yizḥak observes that Jews are parties to a covenantal relationship requiring each person to serve as a surety for observance of the commandments by all others. The principle of suretyship, or arvut, is limited to transgressions of which one has knowledge; there is no responsibility, and hence no onus of suretyship, regarding the transgression of a fellow Jew of which one has no knowledge. The latter are in the category of nistarot, i.e., "concealed" or secret things, that are depicted in Deuteronomy 29:28 as matters to be dealt with solely by God. Applying that thesis to the paradigm case of hal'itehu la-rasha, viz., the situation described in Bava Kamma 69a, Ein Yizḥak asserts that, since the identity of the individuals who steal grapes from the vineyard is unknown, those infractions are "concealed" and hence there is no obligation to prevent transgression by such individuals.³⁸See also R. Joshua Baumol, Teshuvot Emek Halakhah, II, no. 6.