Halakhah su Deuteronomio 32:78
Shulchan Shel Arba
One also has to take care to spread a cloth over the bread on the table when saying the blessing, for thus it was the custom of the old-timers to cover the bread when they would recite birkat ha-mazon, so that the bread won’t be embarrassed (that we’re reciting this blessing for the food over wine and not bread), and likewise when they would recite the Shabbat Kiddush on wine and not bread. And so they said for the daytime Kiddush: “One spreads a cloth and recites the Kiddush,”201B. Pesah 100a. that is to say, one spreads a cloth over the bread, and then one recites the Kiddush over the wine. There is also in this an allusion and symbol of the descent of the manna, which when the manna first came down, it would come down on the surface of the wilderness, which is what this meant: “in the morning there was a fall of dew,”202Ex 16:13. and afterwards, the manna fell on it [the dew], which is what is meant by “over the surface of the wilderness lay a fine and flaky substance, as fine as frost on the ground.”203Ex 16:14. And it is written “when the fall of dew lifted” and not “when the fall of manna lifted,” so that “when the fall of dew lifted” teaches you that another layer of dew came down upon it [the manna].204Ibid. In other words, R. Bahya interprets the miracle of the manna to include two separate dewfalls, in between which the manna was sandwiched. And so our rabbis z”l said, “Dew above and dew below and the manna in the middle, as if it were packed in a box.”205Mekhilta Va-Yisa 3, which R. Bahya also brings in his Torah Commentary on to Ex 16:13. In other words, it was even more miraculous than other miracles, because the manna didn’t just fall, but rather God wrapped it in dew as he were a parent lovingly sending a “care package” to the Israelites. Therefore here at the table one spreads cloth and recites the Kiddush – a cloth above, a cloth below, and the bread in the middle. For this is a symbolic re-enactment of the descent of the manna.206Likewise the Tosafot to b. Pesahim 100b explain this practice.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
Birkat ha-mazon is from the Torah, as it is said, “When you have eaten your fill, you shall bless the Lord your God.”219Deut 8:10. The complete verse is “When you have eaten your fill, you shall bless the Lord your God for the good land which he has given you.” And they taught in a baraita:220B. Berakhot 48b. “you shall bless” – this is the blessing “ha-zan;” “the Lord your God” – this is birkat ha-zimmun (“the blessing of invitation”); “for the land” – this is the blessing “ha-aretz” (“for the land”); “good” [ha-tovah]– this is the blessing “boneh Yerushalayim.” And therefore it says “the good hill country [ha-har ha-tov] and the Lebanon.”221Deut 3:25. I have only a blessing after the meal; from where do I get before it? Scripture says “”which He has given you” – from the moment He has given it to you, you are obligated to bless Him. Our rabbis z”l taught in a midrash: Moses instituted the blessing “ha-zan” for Israel when the manna fell down for them; Joshua instituted the blessing “ha-aretz” when he led them into to the land, and David and Solomon instituted “boneh Yerushalayim.”222B. Berakhot 48b. And you will also find in the story of the manna a hint at the blessing “ha-zan” in the manna itself, as it is said, “In the morning you shall have your fill of bread,223Ex 16:12. and you shall know that I the Lord am you God” – this knowing will occur when remind yourselves of it when you say a blessing over eating the manna. The fourth blessing, “ha-tov ve-ha-metiv,” was instituted at Yavneh. Our rabbis z”l needed to make reference in the blessing “ha-aretz” the Torah, and also refer in it to the covenant (brit), and for them to mention brit before Torah,224In B. Berakhot 48b-49a it says that Torah was given through three covenants, while the covenant of circumcision was given through thirteen covenants. R. Bahya explains the point of this allusion in what follows. so it would be said like this: “brit and Torah, life and food, for your brit which you sealed [upon us] and your Torah which you taught us.”225A quotation from a version of birkat ha-mazon used by R. Bahya and his contemporaries, but slightly different from the version we use now. And the reason that they needed to mention both in the blessing “ha-aretz” was to instruct us that it was because of the Torah that we merited the inheritance of the Land.226And so the Tur, and Rashi’s commentary on b. Berakhot 48b. And this is the reason for the setting up of the stones upon which “the whole Torah” is written, and this is what is meant by “to [le-ma’an] enter the land.”227Dt 27:3. Le-ma’an means literally “for the sake of” R. Bahya alludes to stones Moses instructed the Israelites to set up in Dt 27:2-3: “As soon as you have crossed the Jordan into the land that the Lord your God is giving you, you shall set up large stones. Coat them with plaster and inscribe upon them all the words of this Torah when you cross over in order, to enter the land that the Lord you God is giving you.” Le-ma’an – “for the sake of” this Torah “you will enter the Land.” And in my opinion, in “to [le-ma’an] enter the land,” “le-ma’an” means “so that you are able to enter,” that is to say, “Insofar as I am commanding you to write on them the whole Torah, so you will have the power to enter the land, because the power of the Torah will cut out [yakhritu] 228R. Bahya’s word choice here is rich in relevant connotations. “Cut out” – yakhrit – is from the root of the same verb “karat” used in the Biblical expression “to cut a covenant”- likrot brit – that is, to make a covenant, and also used for the punishment of someone who violates the covenant, e.g., as in Ex 12:15: “Whoever eats leavened bread from the first day to the seventh day [of Passover], that person shall be cut off [nikhreta] from Israel.”the enemies of the land, so that you will inherit it.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
And the reason for mentioning brit before the Torah is because the Torah was given through three covenants, while brit milah – circumcision was given through thirteen covenants, and they are mentioned in the account of Abraham’s circumcision, and for the sake of all sixteen of these covenants, we are rescued from midat ha-din, the sword [herev]of the Holy One Blessed be He, which has sixteen mouths that say “smite the enemies!” Moses referred to this in his promise for the future, “When I whet My flashing sword [harbi] and My hand lays hold of justice.”229Dt 32:41. In other words, here God’s sword is associated with His hand that exercises justice – His left hand, midat ha-din. He connected the yod ending harbi(“my sword”) with the initial vav of ve-tohez (“lays hold of”) in order to hint at “the sword of sixteen.” Understand this verse: “Be in fear of the sword [herev], for fury is iniquity worthy of the sword [herev]; know there is a judgment [she–din].230Job 19:29. This means “be in fear of the sword from above,” for iniquity cause the “fury” and “sword” below, and so to this end you should know that there is justice and the world is not random, and with this sword the wicked are judged, and that righteous not only need not be afraid of it, but indeed it is put into their hands. That is what is written “with paeans to God in their throat and two-edged swords [herev pipiyot] in their hand”231Ps 149:6. – read in it “sixteen mouths – piyot.” So understand this! For this is a deep matter linked to some of the letters on the Lord’s great Name itself, but it’s my intention to limit what I say about it.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
Birkat ha-mazon is recited with at least three adults, as it is said, “Exalt the Lord with me.233Ps 34:4: Gadlu la-Shem iti. Gadlu is a plural imperative, so it includes at least two; iti – “with me” adds one more, making it at least three. With three, one says in the zimmun “nivarekh she-akhalnu mishelo” – “Let us bless Him from whose food we have eaten” without mentioning God’s name. And with ten one does mention God’s name: nivarekh eloheynu– “Let us bless our God.”234B. Berakhot 49b, and so the Tur and Orah Hayim 192. And one does not say “Barekhu eloheynu” – “Bless our God,” in other words, one should not exclude himself from the group. Thus I conclude that “nivarekh” is preferable, but if someone has said “barekhu,” one doesn’t hold it against him.235B. Berakhot 50a. In other words, it is acceptable to say “barekhu.” Regardless if the number of diners is eleven or 110,000, one says, “nivarekh eloheynu she-akhalnu mishelo,” because ten is the number that includes everything and there is nothing after it, unless it is doubled [?]. If one leading a zimmun of three says, “nivarekh she-akhalnu mishelo” – “Let us bless Him from whose food we have eaten,” the other two reply as if he were beginning with “Barukh she-akhalnu mishelo uv-tuvo hayinu” –“Blessed be the One from whose food we ate and by whose goodness we live.” If one leading a zimmun of ten says, “nivarekh eloheynu she-akhalnu mishelo” – “Let us bless our God from whose food we have eaten,” the rest reply with “Barukh eloheynu she-akhalnu mishelo uv-tuvo hayinu” –“Blessed be our God from whose food we ate and by whose goodness we live.” Those outside of the table answer “Amen,” which is like the matter discussed in tractate Yoma:236B. Yoma 37a. “For the name of the Lord I proclaim; Give glory to our God!”237Dt 32:3. When “I proclaim the name ‘Lord,’ You give glory to ‘Eloheynu,’ namely, you should answer “Amen.”
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Shulchan Shel Arba
And you already knew that the words of our rabbis follow the Torah’s means of expression, and so in the Torah there are permitted and prohibited foods: this you shall eat; this you shall not eat, and it is written, “from their flesh you shall not eat.”27Lev 11:8. You wouldn’t say that this is an allegory – God forbid! – but it’s the actual literal meaning. And so they went on to say The Holy One, blessed be He, will in time to come make a sukkah for the righteous from the skin of Leviathan; for it is said: “Can you fill sukkot with his skin?”28Job 40:31. Sukkot here is spelled with a sin, not a samekh as in sukkah meaning “tent,” and means “darts.” Thus, the meaning of the verse in context is “Can you fill his skin with darts?” If a man is worthy, a sukkah is made for him; if he is not worthy, a shadow [tzel] is made for him, for it is said: “And his head with a fish covering [bi-tziltzel].”29Job 30:41. R. Bahya following the Talmud takes the two parts of this verse in Job as contrasting: the first part hints at the reward of the worthy, the second part to the punishment of the unworthy – “shade.” After this he skips a few lines of Talmud that expand on this theme of the worthy and unworthy’s “rewards.” The rest [of Leviathan] will be spread by the Holy One, blessed be He, upon the walls of Jerusalem, and its splendor will shine from one end of the world to the other; as it is said: “And nations shall walk by Your light.”30Is 60:3, in b. Baba Batra 75a.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
And in connection to this you will also find it plainly stated in Perek Helek34B. Sanhedrin 100a, a well-known passage from the Talmud describing the world to come. that in time to come the human height [komot] will return to two hundred cubits, and they also taught this in a midrash likewise in Perek Sefinah:35B. Baba Batra 75a. “I will lead you komamiyut,”36Lev 26:13, literally, “I will make you walk erect” (JSB), but the midrash plays on the similarity between komamiyut “erect” and komot – “height.” R. Meir says: [it means] two hundred cubits – twice the height of Adam. R. Judah says: A hundred cubits; corresponding to the [height of the] temple and its walls. For it is said: ‘carved after the fashion of the Temple.37Ps 144:22. But insofar as it said,38B. Baba Batra, ibid. The Holy One, Blessed be He, will in time to come bring precious stones and pearls…and will cut out from them [openings] ten by twenty cubits, and will set them up in the gates of Jerusalem, as it is said, “and your gates of stones of carbuncle,”39Is 54:12. it seems from this that the height will be no more than twenty cubits. So therefore it must be said that the gates of the houses are not being spoken about, for how could they enter them at that height?! But rather, it’s certainly the gates of the windows that are being spoken about. And you already knew that parashat “Im Behukotai” is a promise of what will happen in the future, for what it says there never existed in the two Temples, neither in the First nor the Second Temple. For what is destined in the Torah through its promises is not al shlemut, but will happen in time to come after the ancient sin has been atoned for, which has never occurred at any time, and this is what our sages z”l taught in a midrash:40B. M.K. 16b. When David went out to war he killed eight hundred at one time, but was sorry for the two hundred [he would have killed], to fulfill what has been said, “How could one have routed a thousand?”41Dt 32:32, from the future promises enumerated in Deuteronomy. A voice from heaven went out and said, “Were it not for the matter of Uriah the Hittite.”421 Kings 15:5, and see the story in 2 Samuel chapters 11-12. King David fell in love with Uriah’s wife Bathsheba, and so sent Uriah off to the front lines of battle to be killed so that he could marry her.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
Behold it has been made clear to you that from these sixty definite commandments, there are forty-six commandments that women are also obligated, and fourteen that women are not obligated. And the mnemonic for these definite commandments will be, "Sixty are the queens" (Song of Songs 6:8). And the mnemonic for the lessening of fourteen for the women will be, "the might (yad, the letters of which have a numerical value of fourteen) is gone" (Deuteronomy 32:36). Or the mnemonic of the forty-six commandments of the women will be "As for you also, because of the blood (badam, the letters of which have a numerical value of forty-six) of your covenant, I have sent forth your prisoners" (Zechariah 9:11) - meaning, the obligation upon them is the number, badam; and that is a covenant that is definitely obligatory for women. And that is what I wanted to hint regarding the number of the positive commandments.
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Peninei Halakhah, Women's Prayer
“R. Yehuda says in the name of Rav: whence do we derive that a berakha prior to Torah study is of biblical origin? As it is written: ‘When I call the Lord’s name, ascribe greatness to our God’ (Devarim 32:3)” (Berakhot 21a). The meaning of this passage is that the Torah is comprised entirely of God’s names (Zohar 2:87:1; Tikunei Zohar §10), for He is completely concealed from us, and through the Torah God is revealed to the world. Thus, the Torah is God’s “names” – the way He is made manifest in the world. That is the meaning of the verse, “When I call the Lord’s name” – before studying Torah, “Ascribe greatness to our God” – recite a berakha to its Giver.
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Shev Shmat'ta
(Bet) In [Parashat] Haazinu (Deut. 32:46-47) it states, “He said to them, ‘Take to heart all the words that I am testifying to you this day […] that they may keep and do all the words of this Torah. For this is not a trifling thing for you, but it is your life.’” And this is that they should not say that they are not able “to keep and do all of the words of this Torah” – in the way that it is stated in Job 10:7, “It is Your knowledge that I am not guilty”; and as it is stated in the first chapter of Bava Batra, “You have created the righteous, You have created the evil”; but their goodness is not in their hands, but rather only that which has been decreed from His heights of holiness, to provide goodness to the good one.10Bava Batra 16a. Hence it states, “For this is not a trifling thing for you,” – the understanding of [“not… for you”] is from yourselves, with the aspect of a cistern that is not from itself but is instead filled from others. Rather in this matter, you have the aspect of a well which emanates from itself when you keep the commandments of God. That is why it states, “but it is your life,” with the oppositional expression (“but”) – and its understanding is, but rather it is your life and it is in your hands, from yourselves. And so the essence of the creation was that you should ‘all be living today.’ And this is the intention of the statement of the [Sages], may their memory be blessed, “A boor (which can also be read as cistern) does not fear sin” (Avot 2:5). As the fear of Heaven is not decreed upon the drop [that will form the fetus],11See Berakhot 33b. like other virtues that have the aspect of a cistern; as it has the aspect of a well [instead]. And this is why we say about the Torah and the service [to God], “As they are our lives”12From the blessing before the recitation of the Shema. – the understanding of which is that they are our actual lives. And this is also the intention of their statement, may their memory be blessed, “The wicked are called dead even during their lives” (Berakhot 18b). As it is for one man in a thousand that the whole world was created, as company for this [one man]. And everything was created for the righteous. As Rambam writes, “Were it not for the group of crazies that travel in wildernesses, etc. [the world would not be settled for the righteous].”13Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah. According to this, the evil person has no independent life – his life is only the life of the righteous one – and hence, he is called dead.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
A purer or more basic form of psak takes place when a scholar, upon analysis of the problem and perusal of relevant sources, independently formulates an opinion to which he adheres with conviction. Assuming that the decisor is an individual who is higi'a le-hora'ah and that the deliberative process has been undertaken with intellectual honesty, the decisor need not feel conflicted because of opposing views, and those subject to his authority may rely upon his opinion with equanimity.5Although the matter is not quoted by any of the poskim it seems to me that a person intellectually convinced of the correctness of his own position may not himself inform an interlocutor that another more highly regarded authority is of an opposite view, but must refer the individual to that authority directly. There is a talmudic controversy with regard to whether the taste of the gid ha-nasheh is sufficiently pungent so that, if cooked with other food, it renders such food non-kosher. R. Ammi regarded such food to be prohibited. Nevertheless, the Gemara, Ḥullin 99b, reports that when a person brought such a matter before R. Ammi he would refer the person to R. Yitzchak ben Ḥalov who would rule permissively. Quite obviously, R. Ammi regarded R. Yitzchak ben Ḥalov as at least his equal and as a person whose opinion might be relied upon. Why did he not simply inform the interlocutor that, although in his own opinion the food is not permissible, the interlocutor might in good conscience rely upon the lenient view of R. Yitzchak ben Ḥalov?
The talmudic narrative seems to reflect two distinct canons of psak: (1) One decisor may refer with equanimity to a person whose antithetical view is within the parameters of elu ve-elu divrei Elokim ḥayyim. (2) The same decisor dare not himself utter the word “muttar” in the name of another unless he believes that to be true. Perhaps it is the phrase “zekenekha ve-yomru lakh” (Deut. 32:7) that requires the zaken to announce his own opinion rather than the opinion of another. Cf., however, R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach, Minḥat Shlomoh, I, 44, who, while not directly contradicting the foregoing, opines that in cases of controversy regarding a matter of rabbinic prohibition, the posek must inform the interlocutor of the dispute and of the principle that the permissive view may be relied upon. If that is correct, why then, according to the authorities who maintain that the prohibition of ta‘am ke-ikkar is rabbinic in nature, did R. Ammi not himself inform the people in question of the opinion of R. Yitzchak ben Ḥalov and advise them that safek de-rabbanan le-kula?
The same point seems to be reflected in the narrative recorded in Ḥullin 48a regarding the kashrut of an animal whose lungs had areas filled with pus. The Gemara relates that when a case of that nature came before R. Yoḥanan he would send it to R. Judah ben Simeon who would rule that it was permitted. Rashi comments that R. Yoḥanan himself maintained that the animal was not kosher but declined to forbid its use because he was not in possession of a received tradition to that effect. But, if R. Judah ben Simeon’s opinion could be relied upon why did R. Yoḥanan himself not make that information available?
More cryptic but equally germane is the narrative recorded by the Gemara, Ḥullin 44b. An animal with a severed trachea was brought before Rav. Rav proceeded to examine the outer circumference of the trachea with a view to pronouncing the animal non-kosher if the greater part of the outer circumference had not remained intact. R. Kahana and R. Assi objected: “But have you not taught us, Master, to examine it on the basis of the greater part of the hollow [i.e., the inner circumference]?” Thereupon, Rav sent the matter to Rabbah the son of Bar Ḥana who examined the inner part of the circumference and, finding the greater portion to be intact, ruled the animal to be kosher. In this case, Rav was apparently prepared to rule in accordance with the stricter view but, when reminded by his students of his own earlier held permissive view, refused to state that the lenient view might be relied upon and instead put the person consulting him to the trouble of himself seeking out the scholar who would rule permissively.
The talmudic narrative seems to reflect two distinct canons of psak: (1) One decisor may refer with equanimity to a person whose antithetical view is within the parameters of elu ve-elu divrei Elokim ḥayyim. (2) The same decisor dare not himself utter the word “muttar” in the name of another unless he believes that to be true. Perhaps it is the phrase “zekenekha ve-yomru lakh” (Deut. 32:7) that requires the zaken to announce his own opinion rather than the opinion of another. Cf., however, R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach, Minḥat Shlomoh, I, 44, who, while not directly contradicting the foregoing, opines that in cases of controversy regarding a matter of rabbinic prohibition, the posek must inform the interlocutor of the dispute and of the principle that the permissive view may be relied upon. If that is correct, why then, according to the authorities who maintain that the prohibition of ta‘am ke-ikkar is rabbinic in nature, did R. Ammi not himself inform the people in question of the opinion of R. Yitzchak ben Ḥalov and advise them that safek de-rabbanan le-kula?
The same point seems to be reflected in the narrative recorded in Ḥullin 48a regarding the kashrut of an animal whose lungs had areas filled with pus. The Gemara relates that when a case of that nature came before R. Yoḥanan he would send it to R. Judah ben Simeon who would rule that it was permitted. Rashi comments that R. Yoḥanan himself maintained that the animal was not kosher but declined to forbid its use because he was not in possession of a received tradition to that effect. But, if R. Judah ben Simeon’s opinion could be relied upon why did R. Yoḥanan himself not make that information available?
More cryptic but equally germane is the narrative recorded by the Gemara, Ḥullin 44b. An animal with a severed trachea was brought before Rav. Rav proceeded to examine the outer circumference of the trachea with a view to pronouncing the animal non-kosher if the greater part of the outer circumference had not remained intact. R. Kahana and R. Assi objected: “But have you not taught us, Master, to examine it on the basis of the greater part of the hollow [i.e., the inner circumference]?” Thereupon, Rav sent the matter to Rabbah the son of Bar Ḥana who examined the inner part of the circumference and, finding the greater portion to be intact, ruled the animal to be kosher. In this case, Rav was apparently prepared to rule in accordance with the stricter view but, when reminded by his students of his own earlier held permissive view, refused to state that the lenient view might be relied upon and instead put the person consulting him to the trouble of himself seeking out the scholar who would rule permissively.
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Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
Before saying, Tehillos le'eil elyon,4“Praises to the most high Almighty.” you should stand and prepare yourself for the prayer of Shemoneh Esrei [Amidah]. You should rid yourself of phlegm and saliva, and anything that may distract your thoughts; then walk back three steps and say: tehillos le'eil elyon, and continue till [Ga'al Yisrael],5“Who redeemed Israel.” then return [to your position] by walking three steps forward in the manner of one approaching a king. You should not make any interruption between Ga'al Yisrael and Shemoneh Esrei, not even [in response] to Kaddish, Kedusha, or Barechu, because [the prayer of] redemption must be joined to the [Amidah] prayer. It is best to be precise in concluding the berachah of Ga'al Yisrael simultaneously with the chazzan, because should you finish first and the chazzan afterwards, there is a question whether to answer Amein to the berachah of the chazzan;6However if you finished before the chazzan you should answer Amein to his berachah. but when you conclude the berachah with him, you are certainly not required to answer Amein, because you do not answer Amein to your own berachah. (See Chapter Six, paragraph eleven.) In the ma'ariv service, since the berachah preceding the Shemoneh Esrei [does not] end with Ga'al Yisrael, an interruption is permitted, as it is permitted at any place between one chapter and another. [See Chapter 16 paragraph 2] Before praying Shemoneh Esrei, we say the verse: "Hashem, sefasai tiftach" [My Master open my lips]7Psalms 51:17.. This is not [considered] an interruption because it is relevant to the prayer; but the verse: "Ki Sheim Hashem ekra," etc.8“When I proclaim Hashem’s Name.” Deuteronomy 32:3. should not be said [before the Amidah], except at musaf and minchah prayers, before saying, Hashem, sefasai tiftach.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
"Before them," but not before gentiles: Even if with regard to a particular suit you know that they rule in a manner consistent with the laws of Israel, do not bring it before their courts, for one who brings Jewish lawsuits before gentiles profanes the Name of God and ascribes honor to the name of the idols, thereby enhancing their stature (le-haḥashivam),12A variant version reads “le-hashbiḥam” which, in this context, must be understood as having the same connotation. as it is said, "For their rock is not our Rock, nor our enemies judges" (Deuteronomy 32:31), i.e., [if we make] our enemies judges [over us] that is testimony to the superiority of that which they reverence.13See also the supercommentary of R. Eliyahu Mizraḥi, ad locum.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
However, Hokhmat Adam 36:1,13Cf., however, R. Pinchas Eliyahu Eisenthal, Ha-Maḥaneh ha-Ḥaredi, 25 Adar 5764, p. 38, who interprets Ḥokhmat Adam’s comment as referring only to the question of ḥelev of a ḥayyah in conformity with Pri Megadim’s understanding of Shakh, i.e., as ruling that a mesorah is required only to establish that the animal is a ḥayyah rather than a behemah for purposes of permitting consumption of its ḥelev. Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Yoreh De'ah 80:10, and Hazon Ish, as well as Erekh ha-Shulḥan, Yoreh De'ah 80:10 and 82:29, understand Shakh as declaring that all animals are similar to birds in that no species may be accepted as kosher in the absence of a tradition confirming its status.14Rabbi Ari Z. Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals: The Buffalo,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, no. 38 (Fall, 1999), cogently draws attention to the fact that the status of the buffalo is also problematic. This may appear odd to students of Yoreh De‘ah since, basing himself on much earlier authority, Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De‘ah 28:4, identifies the buffalo as a kosher species. Rema agrees but, unlike Shulḥan Arukh who classifies the animal as a behemah, Rema declares that it is doubtful whether its status is that of a behemah or of a ḥayyah. That reference, however, is not to the American buffalo but to a different animal, probably the Asian water buffalo which was introduced to Europe at an early date, but possibly the European bison or, less likely, the African buffalo. The animal referred to in this country as a “buffalo” is not really a buffalo but a unique species of bison. The American bison is indigenous to North America and hence was unknown to the author of Shulḥan Arukh and certainly could not have been known to the much earlier authors upon whom Shulḥan Arukh relies. Since the animal is indigenous to the New World it is obvious that there exists no tradition with regard to its status as a kosher animal. The fact that sale of the meat of the American bison was sanctioned some years ago by a number of kashrut supervising agencies does not necessarily indicate reliance upon the position of Pri Megadim. It may signify nothing more than the understandable, albeit erroneous, assumption that the animal is identical to the “buffalo” expressly sanctioned by Shulḥan Arukh. Moreover, even Ḥazon Ish did not unequivocally brand the “Indian ox” or zebu as unacceptable but indicated that the ultimate determination must rest upon the extent of its similarity to more common cattle. Although halakhic categories and scientific classifications are by no means coextensive or even overlapping, the American buffalo is scientifically classified either as a member of the same genus as true cattle or together with the European bison. The matter can be resolved only by a comparison of the physical characteristics of the American bison with those of the cow or, assuming there is a tradition with regard to its status as a kosher animal, the European bison.
Cf., R. Israel Belsky, Mesorah, no. 20 (Adar 5764), who writes that Ḥazon Ish would have permitted the American bison because it should be considered to be an “ox.” That allegation is entirely unfounded. Zebu, forbidden by Ḥazon Ish are far more similar to cattle, both zoologically and in terms of gross appearance, than are bison. Cf., Halacha Berurah, published by Zeirei Agudath Israel, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 24, in which R. Belsky himself acknowledges that the American bison is not permissible according to Ḥazon Ish.
Parenthetically, the Gemara, Bekhorot 7a, states that a ḥayyah and a behemah cannot mate and produce progeny. Accordingly, the phenomenon of the “beefalo,” a cross between a buffalo and a cow whose meat is commercially available, should demonstrate that the American buffalo is a behemah rather than a ḥayyah. There appears to be no available information with regard to whether any of the other species of buffalo to which Rema may have referred can be crossbred with cattle. Hazon Ish professes that "it is not incumbent upon us to seek reasons" for this stringency15R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik, author of Bet ha-Levi, is quoted in Netivot Rabboteinu le-Bet ha-Levi Brisk, II (Jerusalem, 5763), 102, as stating, “for without a ‘masoret’ it is impossible to permit an ox, even if all the known characteristics are present, with the argument that it is the ox of which the Torah speaks.” The statement was made in the context of identification of the ḥilazon. Bet ha-Levi cites the verse, “Ask your father and he will tell you, your elders (zekenekha) and they will say to you” (Deuteronomy 32:7) and explains the apparent redundancy in the two clauses as follows: The term “zekenekha,” generally rendered as “elders,” also means “wise men.” In this instance it clearly has the latter meaning, i.e., the “wise men” are charged with responding to questions of Halakhah. The first clause, however, speaks of questions addressed to a father who must transmit the answer. The subject of that question addressed to fathers rather than Torah scholars, declares Bet ha-Levi, is empirical in nature, i.e., a matter of fact (meẓi’ut) upon which Halakhah is predicated that must be transmitted by means of a tradition passed down from generation to generation. but that it probably arose in order to prevent error with regard to identification of an unfamiliar species as a ḥayyah or as a behemah and consequent inadvertent transgression with regard to ḥelev or covering the blood. Hazon Ish also asserts that it serves to prevent transgression with regard to the prohibition of treifot that is attendant upon certain anatomical anomalies.16Thus, on the basis of the reasons for the prohibition spelled out by Ḥazon Ish, the fact that the zebu can hybridize with cattle is entirely irrelevant. Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” pp. 126–127, seems to have missed this point. Cf., Halacha Berurah, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 27. Moreover, whether the basis of this halakhic position is fear of genetic mutation, possible treifut or some other consideration, it is clear that Shakh and those who follow his ruling declare that, in the absence of a mesorah, the biblical criteria of a kosher species, i.e., a split hoof and chewing of the cud, cannot be relied upon in establishing the kashrut of a species. If biblically prescribed criteria that tautologically define kosher species are for some reason unacceptable, a fortiori, a rabbinically recognized criterion that is merely emblematic of the presence of defining criteria cannot be acceptable. Thus it is not surprising that neither Shakh nor any authority following in his footsteps indicates that the hybridization phenomenon serves as a substitute for a mesorah. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any authority who accepts the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah with regard to birds.
In a letter to the editor published in Tradition, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer, 2002), p. 108, Rabbi Zivitovsky claims that “… many authorities have been willing to rely on the hybridization principle to rule that a bird species is kosher even in the absence of a tradition (see the discussions in, e.g., Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De’a 74; Netsiv, Meshiv Davar, Yoreh De’a 22; Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’a 1:75; Maharsham, Da’at Torah, Yoreh De’a 82:3). That being the case, it would seem that, kal va-ḥomer, the hybridization principle should govern in the case of animals, for whom the tradition requirement is less certain and generally considered a stringency of recent vintage.” Rabbi Zivitovsky reads into the first three sources that he cites much more than they contain. The fourth source, Da‘at Torah of the Maharsham, contains nothing of relevance to this discussion.
Each of the sources deals with problems associated with one or more species of wild duck or wild goose. Although accepted by Ẓemaḥ Ẓedek, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 60, as a member of the same species as the domestic duck or goose, the majority of rabbinic authorities of the day regarded the fowl under discussion as significantly different in its physical characteristics from the species recognized as kosher and, in the absence of a mesorah, refused to recognize the wild duck as kosher. [See, however, R. Yonatan Eybeschutz, Peleti 82:2 and Kereti 82:9, who refers to the bird as a “wild goose” and rules that it is a kosher species.]
Some ducklings of that species were permitted to mingle freely with domestic ducks. The question posed to Ḥatam Sofer was whether future born ducklings born to female domestic ducks were to be regarded as kosher since the fathers may well have been members of unacceptable species of wild duck, Ḥatam Sofer permitted those offspring on the basis of a combination of a number of considerations: 1) Ẓemah Ẓedek ruled that the wild duck was a permitted bird; 2) the ducklings had the physical characteristics of the mother duck, indicating that the father was probably of the same species; 3) the majority of male ducks having access to the females were of the kosher species; and 4) whether or not paternal status could render the offspring non-kosher (ḥosheshin le-zera ha-av) is itself a matter of halakhic doubt. For purposes of the present discussion, the crucial point is that Ẓatam Sofer did not rule that successful hybridization served to confirm Ẓemah Ẓedek’s ruling beyond cavil. Ḥatam Sofer regards the wild duck as a non-kosher bird despite the fact that it was capable of breeding with a kosher species. Indeed, Ḥatam Sofer explicitly affirms that hybridized progeny of that bird are also non-kosher; his lenient ruling is based in part upon the probability that the ducklings in question were not hybridized but sired by a kosher duck. Thus, Ḥatam Sofer clearly refuses to accept the hybridization principle as a substitute for the requisite mesorah.
Meshiv Davar addresses the status of an apparently different species of duck that had been accepted as kosher in some locales. His interlocutor points out that those ducks mate freely with species of duck accepted as kosher. Although Meshiv Davar accepts the species as kosher for a number of reasons, including the fact that it shows no preference whatsoever for its own species over partners from the domestic species, he explicitly rejects the hybridization principle as dispositive with the comment “… for we accept the wild duck as unclean [despite the fact that] it procreates from our duck.”
Rabbi Zivitovsky fails to cite Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 76, dealing with a particular species of duck or goose in which he notes that they breed with kosher species but nevertheless, without citing Bekhorot 7a, comments that, since the two species are housed together for breeding purposes, the fact that they mate does not establish the kashrut of the species. In the very next paragraph he then queries how any bird can be regarded as kosher since it may have a non-kosher progenitor and offers several resolutions to that problem. Quite obviously, Avnei Nezer does not accept the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah.
Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 75, discusses an apparently different species of duck. It seems that the only physical characteristic of the species in question that gave Avnei Nezer pause in issuing a permissive ruling was that, unlike other ducks, its quack was “hoarse.” Avnei Nezer points to the fact that the duck in question breeds with accepted duck species as indicating that they are truly the same species. In that responsum there is no evidence that he would have accepted the hybridization principle as independent validation of the kashrut of the bird in situations in which its physical characteristics were markedly different from an accepted species. Read together with the immediately following responsum, that conclusion is inescapable.
Parenthetically, Ḥatam Sofer and others express some reservation with regard to the applicability of the hybridization principle of Bekhorot 7a to birds. In context, the principle is formulated with regard to animals and hence its extension to birds is a matter of at least some doubt. Thus, logically, grounds for application of the principle to animals are stronger than for birds. However, methodologically, Rabbi Zivitovsky is quite correct. Since Shakh’s requirement of a mesorah to animals is simply an extension of the rule accepted with regard to birds, any alternative mode acceptable with regard to birds should therefore be acceptable with regard to animals as well.
However, since no authority accepts the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah with regard to birds, there is no evidence supporting its acceptability with regard to animals. In light of both Shakh’s failure to regard the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah and Ḥazon Ish’s formulation of the reasons underlying Shakh’s stringency which, as Rabbi Zivitovsky himself candidly concedes, apply with equal cogency in the presence of hybridization, there is simply no basis for concluding that, according to Shakh, hybridization is other than an irrelevant phenomenon. Those anomalies, he claims, particularly with regard to certain structures of the lung, are difficult to recognize in unfamiliar species.17Refraining from an act because of fear of actual transgression, even if such fear is unwarranted, or as a seyag or “fence” designed to prevent transgression in other instances does not involve transgression of “You shall not add thereto” (Deuteronomy 13:1). The statement to the effect that Rabbi Herzog suggested that those who require a tradition confirming the kashrut of an animal species are in violation of this commandment is misleading. See Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” p. 126. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether a “rebellious elder” (zaken mamre) who forbids the meat of such an animal, contra a formal ruling of the Great Sanhedrin, is in violation of the prohibition. Such an individual does not incur capital punishment for issuing a ruling of that nature since the matter cannot result in a transgression involving the penalty of excision (karet) on the part of any person who obeys his ruling. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether, despite the absence of capital punishment, a person ruling in such a manner nevertheless violates the commandment “You shall not add thereto.” It may also be suggested that the consideration reflected in this practice is a fear that an unknown species may, in reality, be the product of genetic mutation of a progenitor that itself was a member of a non-kosher species. Progeny of non-kosher animals are non-kosher even if such progeny manifest all the indicia of kosher species.18For a fuller elucidation of this point see this writer’s “The Babirusa: A Kosher Pig?” Contemporary Halakhic Problems, III (New York: 1989), 66–67.
Cf., R. Israel Belsky, Mesorah, no. 20 (Adar 5764), who writes that Ḥazon Ish would have permitted the American bison because it should be considered to be an “ox.” That allegation is entirely unfounded. Zebu, forbidden by Ḥazon Ish are far more similar to cattle, both zoologically and in terms of gross appearance, than are bison. Cf., Halacha Berurah, published by Zeirei Agudath Israel, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 24, in which R. Belsky himself acknowledges that the American bison is not permissible according to Ḥazon Ish.
Parenthetically, the Gemara, Bekhorot 7a, states that a ḥayyah and a behemah cannot mate and produce progeny. Accordingly, the phenomenon of the “beefalo,” a cross between a buffalo and a cow whose meat is commercially available, should demonstrate that the American buffalo is a behemah rather than a ḥayyah. There appears to be no available information with regard to whether any of the other species of buffalo to which Rema may have referred can be crossbred with cattle. Hazon Ish professes that "it is not incumbent upon us to seek reasons" for this stringency15R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik, author of Bet ha-Levi, is quoted in Netivot Rabboteinu le-Bet ha-Levi Brisk, II (Jerusalem, 5763), 102, as stating, “for without a ‘masoret’ it is impossible to permit an ox, even if all the known characteristics are present, with the argument that it is the ox of which the Torah speaks.” The statement was made in the context of identification of the ḥilazon. Bet ha-Levi cites the verse, “Ask your father and he will tell you, your elders (zekenekha) and they will say to you” (Deuteronomy 32:7) and explains the apparent redundancy in the two clauses as follows: The term “zekenekha,” generally rendered as “elders,” also means “wise men.” In this instance it clearly has the latter meaning, i.e., the “wise men” are charged with responding to questions of Halakhah. The first clause, however, speaks of questions addressed to a father who must transmit the answer. The subject of that question addressed to fathers rather than Torah scholars, declares Bet ha-Levi, is empirical in nature, i.e., a matter of fact (meẓi’ut) upon which Halakhah is predicated that must be transmitted by means of a tradition passed down from generation to generation. but that it probably arose in order to prevent error with regard to identification of an unfamiliar species as a ḥayyah or as a behemah and consequent inadvertent transgression with regard to ḥelev or covering the blood. Hazon Ish also asserts that it serves to prevent transgression with regard to the prohibition of treifot that is attendant upon certain anatomical anomalies.16Thus, on the basis of the reasons for the prohibition spelled out by Ḥazon Ish, the fact that the zebu can hybridize with cattle is entirely irrelevant. Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” pp. 126–127, seems to have missed this point. Cf., Halacha Berurah, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 27. Moreover, whether the basis of this halakhic position is fear of genetic mutation, possible treifut or some other consideration, it is clear that Shakh and those who follow his ruling declare that, in the absence of a mesorah, the biblical criteria of a kosher species, i.e., a split hoof and chewing of the cud, cannot be relied upon in establishing the kashrut of a species. If biblically prescribed criteria that tautologically define kosher species are for some reason unacceptable, a fortiori, a rabbinically recognized criterion that is merely emblematic of the presence of defining criteria cannot be acceptable. Thus it is not surprising that neither Shakh nor any authority following in his footsteps indicates that the hybridization phenomenon serves as a substitute for a mesorah. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any authority who accepts the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah with regard to birds.
In a letter to the editor published in Tradition, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer, 2002), p. 108, Rabbi Zivitovsky claims that “… many authorities have been willing to rely on the hybridization principle to rule that a bird species is kosher even in the absence of a tradition (see the discussions in, e.g., Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De’a 74; Netsiv, Meshiv Davar, Yoreh De’a 22; Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’a 1:75; Maharsham, Da’at Torah, Yoreh De’a 82:3). That being the case, it would seem that, kal va-ḥomer, the hybridization principle should govern in the case of animals, for whom the tradition requirement is less certain and generally considered a stringency of recent vintage.” Rabbi Zivitovsky reads into the first three sources that he cites much more than they contain. The fourth source, Da‘at Torah of the Maharsham, contains nothing of relevance to this discussion.
Each of the sources deals with problems associated with one or more species of wild duck or wild goose. Although accepted by Ẓemaḥ Ẓedek, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 60, as a member of the same species as the domestic duck or goose, the majority of rabbinic authorities of the day regarded the fowl under discussion as significantly different in its physical characteristics from the species recognized as kosher and, in the absence of a mesorah, refused to recognize the wild duck as kosher. [See, however, R. Yonatan Eybeschutz, Peleti 82:2 and Kereti 82:9, who refers to the bird as a “wild goose” and rules that it is a kosher species.]
Some ducklings of that species were permitted to mingle freely with domestic ducks. The question posed to Ḥatam Sofer was whether future born ducklings born to female domestic ducks were to be regarded as kosher since the fathers may well have been members of unacceptable species of wild duck, Ḥatam Sofer permitted those offspring on the basis of a combination of a number of considerations: 1) Ẓemah Ẓedek ruled that the wild duck was a permitted bird; 2) the ducklings had the physical characteristics of the mother duck, indicating that the father was probably of the same species; 3) the majority of male ducks having access to the females were of the kosher species; and 4) whether or not paternal status could render the offspring non-kosher (ḥosheshin le-zera ha-av) is itself a matter of halakhic doubt. For purposes of the present discussion, the crucial point is that Ẓatam Sofer did not rule that successful hybridization served to confirm Ẓemah Ẓedek’s ruling beyond cavil. Ḥatam Sofer regards the wild duck as a non-kosher bird despite the fact that it was capable of breeding with a kosher species. Indeed, Ḥatam Sofer explicitly affirms that hybridized progeny of that bird are also non-kosher; his lenient ruling is based in part upon the probability that the ducklings in question were not hybridized but sired by a kosher duck. Thus, Ḥatam Sofer clearly refuses to accept the hybridization principle as a substitute for the requisite mesorah.
Meshiv Davar addresses the status of an apparently different species of duck that had been accepted as kosher in some locales. His interlocutor points out that those ducks mate freely with species of duck accepted as kosher. Although Meshiv Davar accepts the species as kosher for a number of reasons, including the fact that it shows no preference whatsoever for its own species over partners from the domestic species, he explicitly rejects the hybridization principle as dispositive with the comment “… for we accept the wild duck as unclean [despite the fact that] it procreates from our duck.”
Rabbi Zivitovsky fails to cite Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 76, dealing with a particular species of duck or goose in which he notes that they breed with kosher species but nevertheless, without citing Bekhorot 7a, comments that, since the two species are housed together for breeding purposes, the fact that they mate does not establish the kashrut of the species. In the very next paragraph he then queries how any bird can be regarded as kosher since it may have a non-kosher progenitor and offers several resolutions to that problem. Quite obviously, Avnei Nezer does not accept the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah.
Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 75, discusses an apparently different species of duck. It seems that the only physical characteristic of the species in question that gave Avnei Nezer pause in issuing a permissive ruling was that, unlike other ducks, its quack was “hoarse.” Avnei Nezer points to the fact that the duck in question breeds with accepted duck species as indicating that they are truly the same species. In that responsum there is no evidence that he would have accepted the hybridization principle as independent validation of the kashrut of the bird in situations in which its physical characteristics were markedly different from an accepted species. Read together with the immediately following responsum, that conclusion is inescapable.
Parenthetically, Ḥatam Sofer and others express some reservation with regard to the applicability of the hybridization principle of Bekhorot 7a to birds. In context, the principle is formulated with regard to animals and hence its extension to birds is a matter of at least some doubt. Thus, logically, grounds for application of the principle to animals are stronger than for birds. However, methodologically, Rabbi Zivitovsky is quite correct. Since Shakh’s requirement of a mesorah to animals is simply an extension of the rule accepted with regard to birds, any alternative mode acceptable with regard to birds should therefore be acceptable with regard to animals as well.
However, since no authority accepts the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah with regard to birds, there is no evidence supporting its acceptability with regard to animals. In light of both Shakh’s failure to regard the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah and Ḥazon Ish’s formulation of the reasons underlying Shakh’s stringency which, as Rabbi Zivitovsky himself candidly concedes, apply with equal cogency in the presence of hybridization, there is simply no basis for concluding that, according to Shakh, hybridization is other than an irrelevant phenomenon. Those anomalies, he claims, particularly with regard to certain structures of the lung, are difficult to recognize in unfamiliar species.17Refraining from an act because of fear of actual transgression, even if such fear is unwarranted, or as a seyag or “fence” designed to prevent transgression in other instances does not involve transgression of “You shall not add thereto” (Deuteronomy 13:1). The statement to the effect that Rabbi Herzog suggested that those who require a tradition confirming the kashrut of an animal species are in violation of this commandment is misleading. See Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” p. 126. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether a “rebellious elder” (zaken mamre) who forbids the meat of such an animal, contra a formal ruling of the Great Sanhedrin, is in violation of the prohibition. Such an individual does not incur capital punishment for issuing a ruling of that nature since the matter cannot result in a transgression involving the penalty of excision (karet) on the part of any person who obeys his ruling. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether, despite the absence of capital punishment, a person ruling in such a manner nevertheless violates the commandment “You shall not add thereto.” It may also be suggested that the consideration reflected in this practice is a fear that an unknown species may, in reality, be the product of genetic mutation of a progenitor that itself was a member of a non-kosher species. Progeny of non-kosher animals are non-kosher even if such progeny manifest all the indicia of kosher species.18For a fuller elucidation of this point see this writer’s “The Babirusa: A Kosher Pig?” Contemporary Halakhic Problems, III (New York: 1989), 66–67.
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(Yod) “The fear of the Lord was its storage chest” (Isaiah 33:6). And [this] means like that which [Rabbi Bachya] said in the Duties of the Heart, “And be careful that that your enterprise in your acts for God not be like the enterprise of the bird about which the verse says that it lays its egg and warms it on top of the ground and so fails to safeguard it, to the point that other animals destroy it and it does not become a fledgling.” [This is] like the verse states (Job 39:13-14), “The wing of the ostrich spreads […]. She leaves her eggs on the ground, etc.” And even one who is occupied with Torah, the commandments and acts of lovingkindness require safeguarding. And that is fear [of God] – like the kav of ḥomton (a substance that keeps pests away from grain), as is elucidated in the Talmud (Shabbat 31a-31b).87See the next paragraph. And it is written,88The first and last part of the quote is from Exod. 20:16-17, but the middle is from Deut. 5:22. “You speak to us […] and we will hear, lest the great fire consume us. And [Moshe] said […], ‘Be not afraid; for God has come only in order to test you, and in order that the fear of Him may be upon your faces.’” And at first glance, this is not understood – first he says, “Be not afraid”; and at the end he says, “in order that the fear of Him may be upon your faces.” And it appears to me [that it can be explained] according to that which is said about one of those who had fear [of God]: That they found him sleeping in one of the wildernesses and said to him, “Are you not afraid of lions; that you are sleeping in this place?” He said [back] to them, “I am ashamed in front of God to have any fear besides my fear of Him.” [This is] brought in the Duties of the Heart (in the Section on Love, Chapter 6).8910:6. See there. And this is the intention of the statement of [the Sages], may their memory be blessed, “‘That fear of Him may be upon your faces’ – this is [referring to] shame” (Nedarim 20a). The explanation is that they be embarrassed to fear anything else behind Him, may He be blessed. And this is what Moshe told them, “Be not afraid,” meaning that they not be afraid from the voices and the fire – like they said, “Lest it consume us.” But only “the fear of Him should be upon your faces” – and that is the shame. And anyone who is on this level will have all of his actions dedicated to His name, may He be blessed. And with this, there will be a safeguarding of his Torah and his good deeds. And so did Kohelet say (Ecclesiastes 12:13), “Fear God and guard His commandments” – and its explanation is that only through fear of Him will his commandments be guarded, just like the wheat with the kav of ḥomton. And without the safeguarding, the Torah [that one studies] and the commandments [he performs] are not lasting. And in the Zohar, fear [of God] is given the name daughter; and Torah, the name son. And it is possible that they were hinting to this in the Talmud (Bava Batra 141a), “A daughter first is a good sign for sons. […] because she raises [the sons].” [This is] according to that which is written in Avot 3:9, “Anyone whose fear of sin precedes his wisdom, etc. And anyone whose wisdom precedes his fear of sin, etc.” And this is [the meaning of “A daughter first,” meaning fear, “is a good sign for sons,” meaning Torah – “because she raises [the sons].” As through it, the Torah [study becomes] lasting. And through this, the explanation of the song of Haazinu becomes elucidated – “The Lord saw and was vexed, and spurned His sons and His daughters” (Deut. 32:19): [This] means that they had the son come before the daughter – the explanation of which is that Torah [preceded] fear. “And He said, ‘I will see how they fare in the end, for they are a generation of reverses’” (Deut. 32:20), as they reverse the order; and as a result of this, they are “children with no faith in them,” – the explanation of which is that also the Torah [study] that they have with them will not grow and be lasting with them.
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Shev Shmat'ta
(Yod) “The fear of the Lord was its storage chest” (Isaiah 33:6). And [this] means like that which [Rabbi Bachya] said in the Duties of the Heart, “And be careful that that your enterprise in your acts for God not be like the enterprise of the bird about which the verse says that it lays its egg and warms it on top of the ground and so fails to safeguard it, to the point that other animals destroy it and it does not become a fledgling.” [This is] like the verse states (Job 39:13-14), “The wing of the ostrich spreads […]. She leaves her eggs on the ground, etc.” And even one who is occupied with Torah, the commandments and acts of lovingkindness require safeguarding. And that is fear [of God] – like the kav of ḥomton (a substance that keeps pests away from grain), as is elucidated in the Talmud (Shabbat 31a-31b).87See the next paragraph. And it is written,88The first and last part of the quote is from Exod. 20:16-17, but the middle is from Deut. 5:22. “You speak to us […] and we will hear, lest the great fire consume us. And [Moshe] said […], ‘Be not afraid; for God has come only in order to test you, and in order that the fear of Him may be upon your faces.’” And at first glance, this is not understood – first he says, “Be not afraid”; and at the end he says, “in order that the fear of Him may be upon your faces.” And it appears to me [that it can be explained] according to that which is said about one of those who had fear [of God]: That they found him sleeping in one of the wildernesses and said to him, “Are you not afraid of lions; that you are sleeping in this place?” He said [back] to them, “I am ashamed in front of God to have any fear besides my fear of Him.” [This is] brought in the Duties of the Heart (in the Section on Love, Chapter 6).8910:6. See there. And this is the intention of the statement of [the Sages], may their memory be blessed, “‘That fear of Him may be upon your faces’ – this is [referring to] shame” (Nedarim 20a). The explanation is that they be embarrassed to fear anything else behind Him, may He be blessed. And this is what Moshe told them, “Be not afraid,” meaning that they not be afraid from the voices and the fire – like they said, “Lest it consume us.” But only “the fear of Him should be upon your faces” – and that is the shame. And anyone who is on this level will have all of his actions dedicated to His name, may He be blessed. And with this, there will be a safeguarding of his Torah and his good deeds. And so did Kohelet say (Ecclesiastes 12:13), “Fear God and guard His commandments” – and its explanation is that only through fear of Him will his commandments be guarded, just like the wheat with the kav of ḥomton. And without the safeguarding, the Torah [that one studies] and the commandments [he performs] are not lasting. And in the Zohar, fear [of God] is given the name daughter; and Torah, the name son. And it is possible that they were hinting to this in the Talmud (Bava Batra 141a), “A daughter first is a good sign for sons. […] because she raises [the sons].” [This is] according to that which is written in Avot 3:9, “Anyone whose fear of sin precedes his wisdom, etc. And anyone whose wisdom precedes his fear of sin, etc.” And this is [the meaning of “A daughter first,” meaning fear, “is a good sign for sons,” meaning Torah – “because she raises [the sons].” As through it, the Torah [study becomes] lasting. And through this, the explanation of the song of Haazinu becomes elucidated – “The Lord saw and was vexed, and spurned His sons and His daughters” (Deut. 32:19): [This] means that they had the son come before the daughter – the explanation of which is that Torah [preceded] fear. “And He said, ‘I will see how they fare in the end, for they are a generation of reverses’” (Deut. 32:20), as they reverse the order; and as a result of this, they are “children with no faith in them,” – the explanation of which is that also the Torah [study] that they have with them will not grow and be lasting with them.
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Sefer HaChinukh
And they also made many distancings about the matter of wine, as it was the main [source] for the joy of the offering; and also since the Torah mentioned its prohibition explicitly, as it is written in Parshat Haazinu (Deuteronomy 32:38), "drank the wine of their libations." And hence they, may their memory be blessed, were stringent and said (Avodah Zarah 58a) - in order to distance the matter - that even the wine of a Jew when it is touched by a gentile is immediately prohibited, even to benefit from it. And do not let it be difficult to you, how is it that a gentile can forbid the wine of an Israelite, since we have it established that a person can not bring a prohibition to something that is not his (Chullin 40b). As this is not said except in a case such as if he bows down to his friend's animal, where he did not do an act to the body of the thing. But anytime he does an act to the body of the thing - and even a minor act, like this of touching - he has the power to forbid a thing that is not his, rabbinically. However it is not [forbidden] by Torah writ until he does a major act, such as slaughtering his animal, which is a major act; and so [too,] if he poured wine in front of the actual idol, that is also a major act. But regarding touching the wine not in front of the idol, it is a minor act. And since it is minor and the prohibition is only rabbinic, they, may their memory be blessed, permitted (Avodah Zarah 59b) one to take repayment from the one who made it forbidden for that which he made forbidden. And even though they were stringent about the body of the thing to forbid its benefit, they were not stringent about its payment; as payment [here] is only a type of repayment for damage. And [so] he does not benefit from the forbidden thing, but rather takes payment for his damage from the one who made it forbidden.
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Sefer HaChinukh
In this prevention of wine libations, both Rambam (in Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 194), may his memory be blessed, and Ramban (in his gloss to the Sefer HaMitzvot), may his memory be blessed, conceded that there is a negative commandment in this and that it is counted in the tally of the negative commandments. However they did disagree about it in the [following] matter: that Rambam extracts the prohibition of wine libations from the verse that is written in Parshat Haazinu (Deuteronomy 32:38), "drank the wine of their libations"; and the prohibition of other gifts to idolatry from, "Nothing is to cling to your hand from the anathema"(Deuteronomy 13:18) and from "You shall not bring an abomination" (Deuteronomy 7:26); [whereas] Ramban, may his memory be blessed, wrote that we learn the prohibition of all of the gifts of idolatry from this verse of "Guard yourself," and wine libations are included. And I have written this verse, like his opinion - not like my custom in all of the book, as I have written all [of the other verses] according to the opinion of Rambam, may his memory be blessed. But in this [case] I saw that this verse is very fit to expound the matter from it; and also that there is a warning in it. And [it is] as they, may their memory be blessed, said (Eruvin 96a), [that] every place where it states, "guard yourself," or "lest" or "do not," it is nothing but a negative commandment. However in the verse, "drank the wine of their libations," there is no warning. And I also saw great ones from the enumerators of the commandment that wrote like this.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited us from drinking wine of (an idolatrous) libation. But this does not appear explicitly explained in Scripture. However He does say about idolatry, "Those that did eat the fat of their sacrifices, and drank the wine of their drink offerings" (Deuteronomy 32:38) - [hence] just like the sacrifice is forbidden, so [too] is wine forbidden. And you know that it is forbidden to benefit [from it] and that we give lashes for it, as it is made known in the Talmud. And the proof of wine of a libation being forbidden, that its prohibition is from Torah law and that it is counted among the negative commandments, is their saying in Avodah Zarah (Avodah Zarah 73b), "Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both say, 'Anything forbidden by the Torah [that falls into a mixture] - whether of its own type or another type - [is forbidden where there is enough of the forbidden item] to impart flavor; except untithed produce and wine of a libation, which [render it forbidden] with any amount when with its type; but [only where] it imparts flavor when with another type.'" And this is an explicit proof that the wine of a libation is from the prohibitions of the Torah. And also in the Sifrei (Sifrei Bamidbar 131:2), when it illustrated the description of the Israelites spreading out at Shittim to be involved in licentiousness with the daughters of Moav, they said, "He would enter and the pitcher near her was full of Ammonite wine - the wine of idolaters having not yet been forbidden to Israelites. She said, 'Would you like to drink, etc.?'" Behold from their saying, "the wine of idolaters having not yet been forbidden to Israelites," there is a proof that after this [in the Torah], without a doubt, it was forbidden. However their saying (Shabbat 17b) that among the eighteen things that they decreed, among them was wine; as well as their saying (Avodah Zarah 34a), "It is different, wine of a libation is rabbinic" - the intention was [about] the unspecified wine of gentiles, and not the wine of a libation itself. But the wine of a libation itself is surely forbidden by the Torah. And you already know their saying (Avodah Zarah 30b), "There are three wines, etc." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the last chapters of Avodah Zarah. (See Parashat Haazinu; Mishneh Torah, Forbidden Foods 1.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] because most sins of people are done as a result of much eating and drinking, as it is written (Deuteronomy 32:15), "And Yeshurun grew fat and kicked." And so [too,] "you became fat, you became thick, you became covered; and he abandoned the God that made him, etc." And so [too,] did they, may their memory be blessed, say [about a man's cow] (Berakhot 32a), "Who caused you to kick (rebel against) me? The vetch which I fed you." And more generally they said, "Filling his stomach is a type of sin" - meaning to say after filling the stomach, a person come to do bad sins. And the matter is that foodstuffs are the dough for the physical, whereas contemplation of the intellect and of the fear of God and His precious commandments is the dough of the soul. And the soul and the physical are complete opposites, as I have written at the beginning of the book. And so with the strengthening of the dough of the physical, the dough of the soul is weakened a little. And from this root there were some of the Sages, may their memory be blessed, that would only benefit from foodstuffs just what they required, only to keep their souls alive; and as it is written (Proverbs 13:28), "A righteous person eats to the satiation of his soul." And therefore, for our good, did our perfect Torah prevent us form indulging in eating and drinking more than is necessary - lest the physical overcome the soul greatly, until it makes it ill and destroys it completely. And so in order to distance this matter fully, it warned us about this with a strong punishment - and that is the death penalty. And this is what appears [correct] to me about the topic. And a man is warned about this at the start of the power of the passion of his youth and at the beginning of his obligation to guard his soul (to observe the commandments) - and these are the first three months from when he begins to grow two [pubic] hairs until [the hair] surrounds the whole member. And from that time, he is to take ethical teaching for all of his days. As in that foods are a constant matter with man - it is impossible for him without it - the Torah did not command about it at every instance, but rather it 'teaches him early' at one time, to benefit him for all of the times.
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Sefer HaChinukh
It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] because Israel is the nation that God chose from all the other nations for His service and to recognize His Name, and they are not under the rule of the constellations that God apportioned to all the other nations. They are instead [directly] under the hand of the Holy One, blessed be He, without any intermediary of an angel or constellation; and as it is written (Deuteronomy 32:9), "For the portion of the Lord is His people, Yaakov is the measure of His inheritance." And as you find when He took them out from Egypt - which was a miracle that included all the people - that He took them out by Himself in His glory. And [this is] as they, may their memory be blessed, expounded, "'I will pass through Egypt' (Exodus 12:12) - I and not an angel; 'and I will strike the first-born' - I and not a seraph," as it appears in the Haggadah. And therefore anytime Israel maintains the Torah and crowns themselves with His service, only goodness will rest upon them, and the flow of blessing and a pure benevolent spirit will support them; and the opposite - the curse and the 'dedication' - will [rest] upon their enemies and haters. As such, if one of their tempers become short and he pronounces an expression of curse and 'dedication' on his money or his lands - which are under the blessing - the verse informs that it is impossible to remove it from the domain of the blessed to another domain. [This is] since everything that belongs to Israel - who is the portion of God - is His; [as] whatever a slave acquired, his master acquired (Pesachim 88b). Still, since we truly know that the intention of the one who dedicates is to remove that thing from his domain, it is fitting to fulfill his will; and [so] it returns to the domain of his Master and it becomes holy.
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