Halakhah su Levitico 6:5

For example, R. David ibn Zimra, Teshuvot Radvaz, IV, no. 1,223, (152) addresses a situation involving a defendant who was ordered to swear a solemn oath affirming that he did not owe a sum of money and who was quite prepared to swear to that effect. The claimant, knowing that the oath would be false, queried whether he should allow the defendant to swear falsely or whether he should withdraw his claim. Radvaz responded that the claimant was under no obligation²⁵Cf., the concluding statement in Teshuvot Radvaz, I, no. 354, in which Radvaz reports that, when he had reason to suspect that a defendant would swear falsely, it was his practice to effect a compromise between the litigants and recommends that other judges adopt a similar policy. to absolve the defendant from the required oath.²⁶In this responsum Radvaz focuses upon the financial loss that would be incurred in preventing a false oath and remarks that one who assumes such loss is a “pious fool.” Cf., however, Rashi, Shevu’ot 39b, s.v. halah, and Tosafot, Shevu’ot 47b, s.v. halah, who aver that a plaintiff who has entrusted his funds to an unworthy person is not without blame. See also R. Chaim Palaggi, Nishmat kol Ḥai, II, no. 9, who declares that there is no obligation to accept financial loss in order to prevent transgression on the part of another. Cf., however, R. Chaim Hizkiyahu Medini, Sedei Ḥemed, Kelalim, ma’arekhet ha-heh, sec. 45 and ma’arekhet vav, sec. 30. See also, Teivat Goma, ḥakirah daled, cited by Pitḥei Teshuvah, Yoreh De’ah 157:5. Accepting that premise, R. Shimon ben Gamliel may well be understood as announcing the principle hal’itehu la-rasha only as justification for avoidance of a financial burden such as is entailed in redemption of kerem reva’i. See R. Shimon ha-Levi Gottlieb, Ateret Mordekhai, no. 8, sec. 2. See also infra, note 31.
Cf., R. Aaron Halberstam, Teshuvot Muẓal me-Esh, no. 45, who poses the question more generally in querying how it is ever possible to demand an oath since doing so is, in effect, “placing a stumbling block before the blind” and a person is obligated to sacrifice his entire fortune rather than transgress a negative commandment. Muẓal me-Esh responds cryptically by invoking the principle hal’itehu la-rasha. See also R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach, Teshuvot Minḥat Shlomoh, I, no. 7. That comment, however, begs the question in that it fails to spell out why hal’itehu la-rasha supersedes other halakhic principles. Cf. also, R. David Shlomoh Frankel, Teshuvot Be’er David, no. 24, who argues rather tenuously that, because of the general nature of the prohibition, avoidance of lifnei iver requires an outlay of funds no greater than required for fulfillment of a positive commandment. Cf., ibid., no. 3. The issue is also addressed by R. Amram Bloom, Teshuvot Bet She’arim, Yoreh De’ah, no. 17. R. Chaim Halberstam, Teshuvot Divrei Ḥayyim, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 8, asserts that it is permissible to demand an oath because of a statutory presumption that the defendant will not swear falsely. See also the comments of Imrei Barukh on Turei Even, Megillah 28a. Cf., the comments of R. Chaim ibn Attar, Or ha-Ḥayyim, Leviticus 19:11, to the effect that the plaintiff is forbidden to cause the defendant to swear if he knows that the latter is swearing falsely. Cf., Sedei Ḥemed, Kelalim, ma’arekhet ha-heh, sec. 45 and ma’arekhet vav, sec. 30.
For a discussion of the propriety of, and punishment for, causing a person to swear even a truthful oath see Midrash Rabbah, Leviticus 6:5; Tosafot, Shevu’ot 47b, s.v. halah; Sema, Ḥoshen Mishpat 87:1; and R. Moses Sofer, Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, nos. 73 and 90.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said that even though the fire descended from the Heavens in the days of Moshe, it is a commandment to bring [it] from the commoners, as it is stated (Leviticus 1:7), "And the sons of Aharon shall place fire, etc." And (Mishnah Tamid 2) they would set up wood in the morning and make a large arrangement of wood at the top of the altar, as it is stated (Leviticus 6:5), "and the priest would burn wood each morning." And besides the wood that was set up in the arrangement, it was a commandment upon the priest to bring up two blocks of wood, as it is stated, "and the priest would burn wood (etsim, which is plural)" - and the minimum of etsim is two. And so [too,] would they add two blocks of wood with the daily afternoon sacrifice; and two priests would bring them up, as it is stated, "and they shall set up" - but [for that] of the morning, [it was only] one priest.

And they would make three arrangements of fire on the altar every day. The first one was large, [and] upon it were the daily sacrifice and the other sacrifices offered; the second one on its side was smaller than it, [and] the fire was taken from it in the censer to burn the incense every day; and the third arrangement did not have anything upon it, so as to fulfill the commandment of the fire, as it is stated, "A perpetual fire shall burn, etc." (Yoma 43b). And there are three passages about the topic, which instruct about these three arrangements, as we learned from the tradition. As they, may their memory be blessed, said (Yoma 45b), "'Upon its burning' (Leviticus 6:2), that is the large arrangement; 'and the fire of the altar shall burn upon it' (Leviticus 6:2), that is the second arrangement of the incense; 'And the fire of the altar shall burn upon it' (Leviticus 6:5), that is the third arrangement for the fulfillment of the fire." And the rest of its details are elucidated in the fourth chapter of Yoma and the second of Tamid.