Talmud su Deuteronomio 24:4

If [after betrothal the woman] was raped, she is permitted to him,⁵Cf. Deut. 22, 23-27. but should she have been a willing party she is forbidden to him. If she is the wife of a kohen, she is forbidden to him whether [it happened] under force or with her consent. [For it is stated, And she be not seized⁶Num. 5, 13, E.V. neither she be taken in the act. The phrase is interpreted by the Rabbis in the sense that she did not act under compulsion but willingly, referring to a married woman who was defiled secretly without witnesses to testify against her.—[only then] is she forbidden; if, however, she was seized⁷i.e. violated by force. she is permitted. There is another class of woman who is forbidden [to her husband] even though she had been seized; and who is that? The wife of a kohen.⁸Cf. Yeb. 56b (Sonc. ed., p. 378), Keth. 51b (Sonc. ed., p. 298). R. Ishmael⁹According to R. Ishmael there is no distinction between the wife of a kohen and a lay-Israelite in the case of rape. said: And she be not seized she is forbidden; consequently if she had been seized she is permitted. There is another class of woman who is permitted [to her husband] even if she had not been seized; and who is that? A woman whose betrothal was mistaken.¹⁰If, e.g., a condition were attached to the betrothal that remained unfulfilled. In such a case the woman may leave her husband without a geṭ, and in any subsequent intercourse, whether forced or willing, her status is that of an unmarried woman who had never been previously married. The passage within brackets is added by GRA and is necessary, otherwise R. Ishmael would be contradicting himself. Cf. Yeb. 100b (Sonc. ed., p. 692), Keth. loc. cit.]
If a divorcee who became betrothed was seduced, whether under force or of her free will, she is forbidden to return to her former husband.¹¹If her second husband subsequently died or divorced her. She is, however, permitted to remarry her former husband after betrothal alone, where no marriage with the second man took place and he died. This is the opinion of R. Jose b. Ḳippar in the name of R. Eleazar b. Shammua‘. This is the reasoning by which R. Jose b. Ḳippar expounded his view:¹²This is the reading of GRA as against V and H, who name R. Ishmael as the authority. [It is written,] Her former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled.¹³Deut. 24, 4. In what circumstances did she become defiled?¹⁴If she was legally married to the second husband the term defiled is inapplicable. It can only be explained by what the Sages have said: If a woman [after betrothal] was forcibly seduced, she is permitted to [her husband]; if she was a willing party she is forbidden to him; but in this case,¹⁵Of the divorcee who became betrothed and was then seduced. This is the reading of GRA. V and H have ‘the wife of a kohen’. whether under compulsion or of her free will she is forbidden to return to her former husband.¹⁶So GRA. V and H ‘to him’.

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. ⁴The arguments of this paragraph (except the last one) are repeated in a few short lines in Babli Qiddushin 14a. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife⁵To marry another man. but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.⁶Pulling off the levir’s shoe; Deut. 25:9. The Babli points to another part of the same verse, “so it should be done”, so and not otherwise.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written⁷Deut. 25:5.: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away⁸Deut. 24:4, speaking about the divorced wife.”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “⁹Deut. 24:1. he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have¹⁰There is no verse indicating any action of ḥalîṣah on the status of a married woman.?

A student asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he gave it to her in the morning on condition that he divorce her in the afternoon⁵⁵From the following it seems that the question was about a case in which A gave a wedding gift to a woman stating that she should be preliminarily married to him “from now after a specified time” but divorcing her before the end of the stated period. B preliminarily married the same woman after A’s conditional marriage but before the divorce. The Mishnah refers to the situation after the end of the 30 day period, when both preliminary marriages are in conflict. That situation may be rectified by at least one divorce. But in the situation described here, the question remains whether a divorce is possible for a marriage which has not yet started.? A certain David was of the opinion that anything acquires⁵⁶Therefore, a divorce is possible also for a partial marriage.; Rebbi Ze‘ira said that after thirty days he acquires absolutely⁵⁷He questions the possibility of divorce of a not yet existing marriage.
A Genizah fragment adds a sentence which was lost by the Leiden scribe by homeoteleuton:
ניתגרשה מזה מותר לזה. נית׳ מזה מותר לזה. ניתגרשה משניהן מותר׳ לאיזו … בשלא הוסיף בה השיני
קניין גמור.
If she was divorced by the first, she is permitted to the second; if she was divorced by the second, she is permitted to the first. If she was divorced by both of them, she is permitted to anybody [she likes]. If the second did not add absolute acquisition;
The first two sentences are the conclusion of the previous text. The last sentence is the introduction to the following text. The text does not add anything to the understanding of the Leiden text.. But if the second one added absolute acquisition, I am reading for her: “Her first husband who had sent her away cannot return to take her back.⁵⁸Deut. 24:4. If the second preliminary marriage was unconditional and the second man died, the first who had given a divorce whose validity may be suspect cannot marry the woman, since for the rule that a divorcee married to another man may not be taken back by her first husband, the divorce and the preliminary marriage to the second man was real.”