신명기 17:15의 Halakhah

We do not appoint a woman as king, as the Torah states (Devarim 17:15), "Appoint a king" - but not a queen. Similarly, a woman may not be appointed to any leadership position among the Jewish people.

The major halakhic consideration militating against women's eligibility to serve in positions of communal office is Rambam's ruling, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5: "A woman may not be established as monarch as it is said '[You shall set] over you a king,' but not a queen. Similarly, with regard to all appointments in Israel, only a man may be appointed to them." Commentaries on Rambam give as the source for this ruling the comments of Sifre, Deuteronomy 17:15. Statements similar to that of Rambam are found in the writings of Ramban, Ran, Rashba, Ritva and Rosh, particularly in their commentaries to Shevu'ot 30a, as well as in those of numerous other early authorities, although it is not certain that all of these authorities endorse Rambam's view that offices other than the monarchy are included in this ban.

A literal reading of I Samuel 8:5 would seem to indicate that this power is shared by the kings of all nations. The elders of Israel demand of Samuel: "Appoint for us a king to judge us like all the nations," i.e., a monarch empowered to administer "the King's justice." In classic rabbinic sources, the phrase "to judge us" was certainly understood as having that connotation. Rabbenu Nissim Gerondi, Derashot ha-Ran, no. 11, seizes upon this phrase in explaining why the request for establishment of a monarchy aroused Samuel's ire. Appointment of a monarch to serve as the head of the Jewish commonwealth constitutes one of the 613 biblical commandments and its fulfillment is regarded as having become incumbent upon the populace upon entry into the Promised Land.³See Deuteronomy 17:15; Sanhedrin 20b; Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:1. Rabbenu Nissim explains that a monarch is required for two purposes: 1) to serve as commander-in-chief of the army; and 2) to serve as chief magistrate in administering extra-statutory punishment when necessary to do so to preserve the social fabric. A request for appointment of a king could not, in and of itself, have been a matter for censure. Rabbenu Nissim asserts that Samuel became angry because the request was couched in a manner that gave voice to a perceived need for imposition of "the King's justice." A well-ordered, law-abiding society has no need for the imposition of emergency ad hoc measures by the monarch; the punishments provided by statute and their imposition in accordance with the rigorous standards of due process prescribed by Jewish law should suffice to protect societal concerns. The request presented to Samuel reflected a recognition by the petitioners that their society could not long endure on the basis of criminal procedure hobbled by a two-witness rule and a requirement for prior warning as well as a host of other impediments to actual imposition of penal sanctions. The anticipation by the petitioners of a breakdown of law and order, for which the sole remedy would have been imposition of "the King's justice," bespoke either an unacceptable lack of confidence in themselves or their peers or, even worse, a realistic assessment of moral degeneration.⁴See R. Abraham Benjamin Sofer, Ketav Sofer, Parashat Shoftim, s.v. od nireh li and R. Yechiel Michal Epstein, Arukh ha-Shulḥan he-‘Atid, Hilkhot Melakhim 71:6–7. The thesis herein presented incorporates elements elucidated by Ketav Sofer that are not explicitly formulated by Derashot ha-Ran. Thus, explains Rabbenu Nissim, Samuel had ample cause for distress.⁵Cf. Sanhedrin 20b which declares that the elders of the generation couched their petition in appropriate language as well as Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:2, who indicates that censure was occasioned by a disdain for the leadership of Samuel.